DUI Law - Florida Says Search Warrants for Blood Draw on Misdemeanors Illegal

In State of Florida v. Geiss, --- So.3d ----, 2011 WL 2097694 (Fla.App. 5 Dist.), 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1132, the Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). A search warrant was issued for his blood. The Circuit Court, Brevard County, George Maxwell, J., suppressed results of defendant's blood test. State appealed.


On appeal, the appellate court held that the State lacked statutory authority to draw blood as property used as a means to commit misdemeanor DUI. The trial court also found that the blood draw was not authorized by the warrant statute, section 933.02, Florida Statutes, because blood is not “property” used as a “means to commit” a crime:

"In addressing this issue, we should first clarify that although this case was ultimately filed as a felony case based upon Geiss's prior DUI record, the affidavit for the search warrant did not set forth Geiss's complete record, and only averred that Geiss possessed one prior DUI conviction. So, the affidavit alleged probable cause to believe that Geiss had violated the misdemeanor DUI statute. This is significant because section 933.02, Florida Statutes, only allows the state to secure a warrant to seize “property ... used as a means to commit” a misdemeanor. § 933.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). By contrast, the statute also authorizes the state to secure a warrant for “property [that] constitutes evidence relevant to proving that a felony has been committed.” § 933.02(3), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also, Bordo, Inc. v. State, 627 So.2d 561, 562–63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (“Thus, property used to commit any crime—whether felony or misdemeanor—may be seized under a warrant; while property merely constituting relevant evidence of a crime may be seized only if the suspected crime is a felony.”). Because the affidavit below only alleged facts supporting probable cause for a misdemeanor DUI, the original issuing magistrate and the trial court reviewing the warrant in the case below properly considered only whether blood constituted “property ... used as a means to commit” the crime of DUI in this case. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 906 So.2d 358 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (limiting review to four corners of search warrant to determine whether sufficient probable cause existed). We agree with the trial court that it was not."


Geiss argued that blood is not “property” within the meaning of the statute. The appellate court wrote:


"The statute uses the word “property,” a broad and flexible term that is not defined in the statute. It is a term that should properly be construed in the context of the statute's purpose of identifying items that are the proper subject of a search warrant. In that sense, “property” does not exclude those substances that are naturally produced by the human body. Human blood, whether it is being stored for later transfusion in a hospital refrigerator, being donated to a blood bank or flowing through the veins of an arrestee, is something tangible over which a person or entity may exercise ownership, which has value and which may be sold or transferred for consideration like other material objects. In those important respects, blood is indistinguishable from other fluid materials such as vodka, insulin or gasoline and like each of them may be seized, secured and subjected to chemical and other scientific analysis. The fact that it would require an invasive procedure to extract fluids from the human body does not alter the form or composition of human blood or make it any less suitable a subject for a search warrant.




State v. Isley, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1102a (Fla. Brevard County Ct.2004), aff'd, Isley v. State, Case No. 05–2004–AP–59852 (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. 2005). Other Florida trial courts have reached the same conclusion. See State v. St. George, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 324a (Fla. Duval County Ct.2009); State v. McKinnon, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 329a (Fla. Duval County Ct.2009). This reasoning is persuasive. Blood may be extracted from the body and donated and/or sold for further use. And, blood has long been routinely seized for testing as evidence in many types of criminal cases. It only makes sense that the legislature would intend the term “property” to broadly include the types of physical items that would routinely be seized in connection with a criminal investigation."


The appellate court nevertheless found that the search warrant was unauthorized:


"However, we agree that blood is not “used as a means to commit” driving under the influence. Instead, blood is seized for its evidentiary value.FN4 And, no one uses his or her blood “as a means to” do anything, as those words are commonly used or understood. Given that statutes should be construed in accordance with their “plain and ordinary meaning,” Osborne v. Dumoulin, 55 So.3d 577, 581 (Fla.2011) (citations omitted), and that search warrants must strictly conform to the statutes and constitutional provisions which authorize their use, State ex rel. Wilson v. Quigg, 154 Fla. 348, 17 So.2d 697, 701 (1944); Crain v. State, 914 So.2d 1015, 1020 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (en banc), we agree with the trial court that blood cannot be drawn based upon probable cause that a suspect has committed misdemeanor DUI in light of the plain language of section 933.02, Florida Statutes.


Unfortunately, applying the good faith exception to warrants as stated in U.S. v. Leon, the appeals court held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied and reversed the suppression.

Editor's Note: Even though this blood draw squeezed in under the gun due to a 'good faith' exception, such an exception arguably cannot be used again, because the courts have now put the police on notice (through this opinion) that such warrants are legally unauthorized.

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DUI Appeal of the Day (DAD) - Failure to prove Impairment Despite .09 and Death

This case comes to DAD from expert and Mass attorney Tom Workman. In Commonwealth v. Filoma (2011) a Massachusetts jury convicted the defendant of, inter alia, operating under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. The facts established that the defendant consumed 4-6 beers at a Super Bowl party, and then (when the Patriots won) he attempted to drive to an ex-girlfriends house. The massive fans on the street made travailing the streets difficult. He drove backwards on a one-way street at about 20-35 mph until police attempted to stop him. He then drove forward at speeds up to 60mph while students/fans jumped out of the way. He eventually struck 5 pedestrians, killing one and seriously injuring 2 others. At the station, he passed the only filed sobriety test. Many hours post-arrest, he blew .09 Brac twice. The State chose to omit any instructions regarding a presumption of guilt at or above 0.08 (perhaps because of the time delay).

The State expert provided the opinion that the defendant's readings of .09 at 4:27 A.M. and 4:30 A.M. enabled projections of higher amounts of .10 percent to .14 percent as of 2:15 A.M. and inferably higher amounts two and one-half hours earlier, at the time of the events on Symphony Road. However, the expert never explained the fundamental connection between the amounts of blood alcohol content and the punishable condition of impairment: the diminished capacity to operate a motor vehicle safely. The appeals court went on to state:

"The omission of that explanatory connection, in the words of the Colturi decision, left the jury "to guess at [the] meaning" of the breathalyzer measurements. (citation) Consequently, in the absence of the per se theory instruction and of an impairment theory expert opinion, proof of the elements of operating under the influence was deficient."

The appeals court therefore reversed the conviction for OUI outright.


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DUI Appeal of the Day (DAD) - Destruction of Blood Sample, In-Court Identification and Due Process

In Iowa v. Kardell, Slip Copy, 2011 WL 441961 (Table) (Iowa App.) the defendant was convicted of two counts of homicide by vehicle by operation while intoxicated. Amongst other issues on appeal, NCDD member and Iowa OWI attorney Matt Lindholm complained that the destruction of the blood sample violated the defendant's due process rights. In the case, the blood was analyzed and the result was 0.07 BAC. Notice of the result was not sent to the defense until after the blood sample was routinely destroyed (Iowa has a 90 day retention and destruction policy). The defendant claimed that the destruction a) violated state laws regarding the safekeeping of personal property b) interfered with his statutory right to independent testing and c) violated his due process rights under both the federal and state constitutions. The defense was unsuccessful on all 3 grounds.

Specifically, the court held that the argument that state law on disposition of personal property required him to receive notice prior to destruction was not capable of being raised for the first time on appeal, so they refused to address it. (This was a clever and great argument by the defense!) Second, they held that the right to an independent test was not violated by the destruction of the sample before notice was given to the defendant, holding that section 321J.11 does not impose a sua sponte duty to provide the defendant with the test results; rather, the only statutory duty is to provide the results upon Kardell's request.

Finally, regarding the due process claim, the court stated:

The Youngblood court was unwilling to “read the ‘fundamental fairness' “ due process requirement to impose on the State an “absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.” Id. at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 337, 102 L.Ed.2d at 289. Accordingly, “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Id. (emphasis added). The Iowa Supreme Court adopted this standard in State v. Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d 787, 791 (Iowa 1992), a drunk driving case in which the defendant sought to suppress test results from a blood withdrawal.Like Kardell, the Dulaney defendant argued the State violated his United States and Iowa due process rights by destroying his blood sample before he was able to have it independently tested. Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d at 790. The Dulaney court discussed and applied the standards established in Trombetta and Youngblood. Id. at 790-91. The Dulaney court specifically recognized the requirement a criminal defendant show bad faith on the part of the State and found “there is no evidence the State intentionally destroyed the sample in an effort to deprive Dulaney of evidence as required by Trombetta and Youngblood. The DCI lab simply destroyed the sample pursuant to its usual procedure....” Id. at 791. The court ruled: “[T]he State's blood sample merely could have been subjected to tests, and the results merely might have exonerated Dulaney. This is not enough under Trombetta and Youngblood to find a violation of Dulaney's due process rights.” Id. Similarly, Kardell's blood sample “merely could have been subjected to tests” with results that “merely might have exonerated” Kardell. See id. This is not enough to find a violation of Kardell's due process rights. See id.; see also State v. Steadman, 350 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1984) (stating “the failure of the State to automatically furnish an accused with a sample ... for independent testing is not a denial of due process”).

The defendant also raised claims involving identification of the defendant as the driver in open court. The defendant argued that the court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence “to provide a sufficient nexus between the person who was driving the vehicle and the person who was charged in the trial information.” Kardell contended that the arresting officer's positive identification of Kardell on direct exam was “rendered useless” on cross-examination because he admitted his identification was based upon the on-scene statements of Trooper Pigsley and Trooper Pigsley did not testify at trial. Among the reasons why the court found sufficient identity had been proven, the court said:

While “proof of the identity of the person who committed the offense is essential to a conviction ... identification may be established and inferred from all of the facts and circumstances in evidence.” Butler v. U.S., 317 F.2d 249, 254 (8th Cir.1963) (citations omitted). * * * “[T]he failure of any ... witnesses to point out that the wrong man had been brought to trial [can be] eloquent and sufficient proof of identity.” Id. (quoting United States v. Weed, 689 F.2d 752, 755 (7th Cir.1982))* * * [P]roper identity can be inferred when the defendant does not complain the wrong person has been brought to trial. See Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249, 254 (8th Cir.1963). The Derek Kardell seated in the courtroom never complained he was not the same Derek Kardell whose truck crashed in October 2007."

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Breathalyzers Read 20-40% Higher in DUI Cases; Cover-up Revealed

DC Breathalyzer Calibration Questioned

WASHINGTON - A man hired to supervise the Breathalyzer unit of the D.C. Police Department is blowing the whistle on what he says are a decade of questionable test results.
Writing in a memo to the D.C. Attorney General he said the officers running the program rarely, if ever, performed accuracy tests on the machines used to measure the blood-alcohol content of drivers suspected of D-W-I.
Two and a half months after taking over the Breath Alcohol Testing Program, Ilmar Paegle, a retired U.S. Park Police officer, wrote a detailed four page memo in which he claims the protocol to ensure the machines were properly calibrated has not been followed since at least 2000. That’s a claim the D.C. Attorney General Office calls just an "opinion."
But Paegle lays out his case in a memo now in the court file of a man convicted of D-W-I. That man wants a new trial.
In the memo addressed to Assistant Attorney General Kimberly Brown, Paegle wrote,
"From my inspection of the instrument files (the machines) have never been checked for accuracy even though an accuracy test is the only legal requirement a breath testing instrument must meet in the District of Columbia."
Paegle continued, "The calibration has to be verified by accuracy tests, and these legally mandated tests of (the machines) apparently have never been done."
David Benowitz represents Sultan Epaye, the man who wants a new trial.
"The ramifications are enormous,” said Benowitz in an interview Tuesday outside D.C. Superior Court. "It goes back for years, there are plenty of people who served jail time based on what may very well be false tests or inaccurate tests, the civil liability could be huge, it just has a huge impact on the integrity of the entire criminal justice system."
Included in the court case jacket are internal D.C. Police documents showing no accuracy tests were performed on the machines after they were calibrated. Those records go back to at least 2006.
But Sarah Branch, the Prosecutor in the case, takes issue with Paegle's claims, writing in a motion for dismissal of conviction, "Mr. Paegle's opinion is based on a review of documents that were created and kept by his predecessor, Officer Kelvin King, the former Chemical Testing Program Manager for MPD. Therefore, Mr. Paegle's opinion consists of nothing more than conjecture and assumptions."

"We strenuously disagree with that characterization," said Benowitz, "It's clear what Mr. Paegle's is saying is based on fact."
In the memo, Paegle also criticizes D.C. Police for the lack of oversight and supervision.
Back in February the Attorney General admitted his office was looking into dozens, if not hundreds of cases, after learning from Paegle the machines were improperly calibrated in the fall of 2008 and were not tested for accuracy.
What Paegle is saying today raises questions about test results as far back as 2000 or longer.
Paegle declined to comment, as did D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier.
Attorney General Peter Nickles referred us to the motion filed in court.



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DUI Appeal of the Day (DAD) When the Expert Can't Add or Subtract

In State of Maine v. Caron, --- A.3d ----, 2011 WL 82197 (Me.), 2011 ME 9, the defendant was charged with DUI following a rollover accident resulting in serious injuries to the vehicle's other occupant. At trial, the issues included whether defendant (or the victim) was the driver, and also extrapolation of the defendant's blood alcohol back to the time of driving. The State's expert testified that he concluded that the defendant was the driver based upon the defendant's "left-sided injuries" and the victim's :right-sided injuries". The state expert also calculated the defendant's BAC to be above the limit at the time of driving.


On appeal, the issue was whether the state's expert was competent and qualified to give the above opinions. Why? Because the expert has a learning disability. During voir dire the State's expert, attempting to describe the nature of his condition, testified that, “I do not know right from left and I do not-am not able to add or subtract even simple numbers.” Noting that the State's expert was ultimately asked to calculate Caron's blood-alcohol level and to explain the significance of left-sided and right-sided injuries, the defendant contended that the State's expert's learning disability rendered him incompetent to testify.



Finding no error in the trial court's determination that the expert was competent, the appellate court stated:



As a general rule, “[e]very person is competent to be a witness.” M.R. Evid. 601(a). Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 601(b)(3), however, a person will be disqualified from testifying if the court finds that “the proposed witness lacked any reasonable ability to perceive the matter.” The phrase “any reasonable ability” was included in Rule 601(b) “ ‘to make it clear that even a limited ability to perceive ... may be sufficient to avoid disqualification.’ “ State v. Gorman, 2004 ME 90, ¶ 22, 854 A.2d 1164, 1170 (quoting Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 601.2 at 244 (2000 ed.)). A trial court's ruling on witness competency is reviewed for clear error. State v. Cochran, 2004 ME 138, ¶ 6, 863 A.2d 263, 265.



We find no clear error in the court's competency determination. Notwithstanding the State's expert's self-reported learning disability, the court was able to observe the apparent fluency with which he explained his opinions, including his ability to distinguish right-sided and left-sided injury patterns and perform the calculations necessary to extrapolate from the results of Caron's blood-alcohol test.

The appellate court held that the expert was qualified and capable to opine, and upheld the conviction. (“When the issue is not what the expert's qualifications are, but whether those qualifications are adequate for the opinion of the expert, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.”).

(Editors note: Keep this one on hand the next time the State suggests that a defense expert is unqualified.)


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DUI Appeal of the Day (DAD) - When is Blood being Drawn for Medical Purposes?

In Arizona v. Hansen, Not Reported in P.3d, 2010 WL 5549045 (Ariz.App. Div. 2) the driver was involved in a single-car accident and eventually transported by ambulance to a hospital. (Interestingly, no injuries to this driver are ever described or mentioned in the opinion). At the hospital, the officer requested that if hospital personnel drew Hansen's blood for any medical reason, they also retain a sample for DPS purposes. A hospital employee then drew blood from Hansen apparently using two needles, one for a blood draw ordered by the attending physician and the other to fill two vials provided by the officer. DPS analysis of the second sample revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .207.

In Arizona, the admissibility of a blood alcohol test varies greatly between that drawn for hospital/medical purposes, and that drawn for police/criminal purposes. At hearing, the defendant Hansen first contended that the trial court erred in determining the blood draw comported with the hospital blood purposes statute, asserting the use of “an additional needle puncture” violated the statute and that the second puncture was not for medical purposes. Amazingly, the Arizona court found that the second needle puncture (and resultant draw) were for medical purposes, stating as follows:

Hansen's contention that the second puncture was not for a medical purpose is similarly unpersuasive both in view of our reasoning in Lind and the factual backdrop of this case. In Lind, hospital personnel drew a blood sample in excess of what was needed for medical purposes in order to set a portion aside for law enforcement use, in keeping with the hospital's established policy. Id. ¶¶ 3-7. We held that the entire sample was for medical purposes within the meaning of the statute, and stressed that the blood draw was not for a legal purpose until law enforcement requested and received the sample. Id. ¶ 19.

¶ 7 Here, the officer arrived at the hospital and requested a blood sample after an attending physician had already ordered a blood draw “for a CBC” (complete blood count), which the hospital's blood technician testified was solely for medical purposes. As in Lind, the officer did not initiate the blood draw but was provided a sample drawn in excess of what was drawn for medical purposes. Although the officer supplied two “gray-topped vials” for the sample, he had no role in the hospital employee's choosing to make two separate punctures; the evidence showed the employee did so according to his own or the hospital's preexisting protocol. And nothing in the record suggests the officer contemplated an additional puncture or was aware of the technician's methods. Because the record shows the officer had no control over the procedure chosen by medical personnel to comply with his request under the statute, and Hansen does not meaningfully challenge any other aspect of the blood draw procedure, the trial court did not err in concluding the blood draw did not violate § 28-1388. Cf. Lind, 191 Ariz. 233, ¶ 19, 954 P.2d at 1062 (hospital's custody and control of all blood drawn factor in concluding portion specifically set aside for police satisfied “medical purposes” requirement of statute).

IMHO, only those persons who have followed Alice down the wormhole could honestly believe that this blood draw was not for police purposes. And in another ringing of the death knell to the exclusionary rule, the court stated:

Hansen also claims the second needle puncture constituted an unconstitutional police intrusion, in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, citing Cocio. We need not explore this issue, however, because under the circumstances of this case, even if the additional puncture raised constitutional concerns, suppression of the blood test evidence was not required. “A Fourth Amendment violation does not mandate reflexive exclusion of evidence.” State v. Booker, 212 Ariz. 502, ¶ 12, 135 P.3d 57, 59 (App.2006). Instead, the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. Id. ¶ 13. The exclusionary rule is not a personal right and applies only as a last resort and when it will result in appreciable deterrence. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, ----, 129 S.Ct. 695, 700 (2009). And “the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.” Id.


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Datamaster calibration errors in Alaska

Image by Getty Images via @daylifeAlaska now joins the ranks of municipalities investigating errors in calculating BAC levels in suspects charged with DUI. As we've discussed in the past, other states include Pennsylvania, Colorado, California, and Indiana. In Alaska, it recently came to light that the Datamasters used to conduct BAC testing in over 2500 cases over the last few years were calibrated improperly. The specific problem is explained in this Anchorage Daily News article as follows:

The problem involves dry gas tanks, also known as “alco bottles,” used in confirming the accuracy of the DataMaster instruments, which drunken-driving suspects blow into to determine breath-alcohol content. The tanks contain a known sample of alcohol that the instrument measures before and after every test to ensure it is functioning properly. When the state crime lab prepares the bottles, the alcohol levels are measured 10 times and the results are entered into a spreadsheet, which calculates the average value. Because air pressure can affect the test results, the average value is then adjusted to a standard barometric pressure from what it was on the day the tank was tested. But back on Feb. 16, 2006, a trainee and an analyst thought the correction factor didn’t appear right and decided to invert the fraction, said Orin Dym, director of the crime lab. And because it was in a spreadsheet that calculated the values automatically, no one noticed until Dec. 8, 2009... By the time the error was discovered, 48 of the 663 tanks prepared in the years involved had been affected, according to the state. That means 2,465 tests were conducted with equipment that was prepared with the inverted fraction and that had been corrected for the barometric pressure in the wrong direction, according to the Department of Public Safety.

The state concedes that the equipment was tested using flawed quality control standards, but claims that the error didn't affect the actual BAC testing--instead, it allegedly impacted only the quality control checks that accompany each test. According to the State, only 2 DUI cases were affected by the error. Alaska criminal defense attorneys aren't buying that theory and at least one is already moving forward with challenging his client's DUI conviction. The Alaska calibration error is just one more example of how tenuous and error-prone the process of measuring blood alcohol levels can be. People's liberty lies in the balance--and in many cases, faulty lab test results or improperly calibrated breath test equipment is the deciding factor. Visit Americas Top DUI and DWI Attorneys at www.1800dialdui.com or call 1-800-DIAL-DUI to find a DUI OUI DWI Attorney Lawyer Now!

Sleeping While Intoxicated-Not a Crime in Pennsylvania

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Last month, we learned that sleeping at the wheel while intoxicated isn't a crime in New Mexico. The issue in cases like this is whether the person asleep behind the wheel exercised sufficient control over the vehicle and elicited an intent to operate the vehicle. This very same issue was recently addressed by a court in Pennsylvania. As explained in this Times Leader article, the accused was found asleep behind the wheel of a vehicle with the engine running. When discovered by the police, he smelled strongly of alcohol and a subsequent blood-alcohol test later revealed he had a level of 0.197, nearly 2 times the legal limit. The Pennsylvania court reached the same decision as the New Mexico court, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that that the accused actually operated the vehicle while intoxicated. The rationale for the judge's decision is explained in the article:

The vehicle was parked at the time Verdekal, 27, of West St. Mary’s Road, was discovered, and police could not prove that he had actually operated the car in an intoxicated state...

The key issue in the Verdekal and other cases revolves around a provision within the drunken driving statute that permits police to charge a driver - even if the vehicle is not moving - as long as the officer can show the operator was in “actual physical control” of the vehicle. The problem for police has been in how appellate courts have interpreted what constitutes “actual physical control,” McMonagle said...

(T)he courts have held that police must look at the “totality of the circumstances” in making that call. There must be some other evidence – such as the car being stopped in the middle of the road, or its tire up on a curb – that would indicate the driver had driven the vehicle while intoxicated prior to the arrival of police at the scene.

Once again, the court's decision focused on evidence of control over the vehicle, rather than simply the fact that he was found behind the wheel of a stationary vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. This makes sense. After all, the intent behind DUI laws is to prevent people from driving while intoxicated, since that's when the risks inherent in driving while intoxicated kick in. If you drive a car while under the influence of alcohol, you put others on the road at risk. However, that danger is not present when a person sleeps in a vehicle while intoxicated. For that reason, many states have adopted the rationale behind the New Mexico and Pennsylvania courts' decisions. Visit Americas Top DUI and DWI Attorneys at www.1800dialdui.com or call 1-800-DIAL-DUI to find a DUI OUI DWI Attorney Lawyer Now!

Intoxilyzer breath test results under fire in Minnesota

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In Minnesota, we learn of yet another case of allegations regarding inaccurate breath test results. The Intoxilyzer machine at issue has been regularly used by law enforcement throughout Minnesota for years, but came under fire in 2006 when a DUI defendant challenged the accuracy of the test. Since that time, the Minnesota Supreme Court has twice considered claims challenging the device. Later, in 2008, the state sued CMI, Inc., the manufacturer the device, seeking access to the machine's source code. CMI resisted at first, but ultimately relented and allowed DUI attorneys access to the information. Now, there are more than 2000 cases pending in state courts that challenge accuracy of the machines, which were recently consolidated. As reported in this TwinCities.com article, a 2006 email from a Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension toxicologist is key evidence in support of the claims in the consolidated cases that the devices produce inaccurate results:

In an e-mail dated Sept. 27, 2006, a Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension toxicologist alerted CMI that the Intoxilyzer "on occasion" printed out blood-alcohol readings different from what it displayed on its screen.

He also noted that the amount of air required for a breath sample varies depending on the version of software running the machine.

The minimal amount of air necessary to provide a breath sample is 1.1 liters of air blown at .17 liters per second. But if a driver blows too hard, the minimum sample required increases to 4.1 liters, according to the toxicologist's e-mail.

"The minimum value quadrupled," Sheridan said. "And by doing that, it would exclude about 80 percent of women. ... The shorter and older you are, you're virtually guaranteed you'd be unable to provide a sample."

The misfires are recorded as test refusals, and that can have disastrous legal consequences. Punishments for test refusals are in some cases more severe than the penalties for drunken driving.

Once again, arguably faulty breath test machines continue to be used despite clear evidence that they may produce inaccurate and misleading results. If people's liberty wasn't at stake, perhaps this egregious conduct could be overlooked. However, where people arguably innocent of a crime are being wrongfully convicted and, in some cases, sent to jail, ignoring the glaring problem with the Intoxilyzer's used in Minnesota simply isn't an option. Visit Americas Top DUI and DWI Attorneys at www.1800dialdui.com or call 1-800-DIAL-DUI to find a DUI OUI DWI Attorney Lawyer Now!

Sloppy lab work leads to Toxicology Chief resigning in Indiana

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Two weeks ago we discussed how lab errors in California, Colorado and Pennsylvania resulted in challenges to DUI convictions and the dismissal of a multitude of DUI cases. It looks like Indiana is joining the club. According to this article from IndyStar.com, the director of the Indiana State Department of Toxicology, Michael A. Wagner, has resigned amidst charges of inexcusable lab errors. Allegations include sloppy lab work, excessively long delays in processing specimens, and the failure to perform inspections as required by state law. In the article, Indianapolis defense attorney John L. Tompkins explained the basis for the allegations:

Tompkins, who teaches blood-testing issues to lawyers for their continuing education requirements, said sloppy work is not unusual from the state Department of Toxicology.

Within the past few months, he said, blood-testing reports have come back showing clotted blood being used -- a mistake -- and incomplete documentation of the testing machine's calibration.

Tompkins also contends that the department ignores a state law enacted in 2007...(which) requires the Department of Toxicology to conduct examinations of the people performing blood-alcohol detection tests and inspections of the equipment they use.

If the allegations are true, the resignation of Wagner is only the first step toward achieving justice for those who have been wrongfully convicted of DUI in Indiana. Simply put, the accusations of sloppy lab work are inexcusable. Where the life and liberty of a person accused of a crime is at stake, it is imperative that lab test results be performed carefully, accurately and in a timely manner. Visit Americas Top DUI and DWI Attorneys at www.1800dialdui.com or call 1-800-DIAL-DUI to find a DUI OUI DWI Attorney Lawyer Now!

Inexcusable lab errors in DUI cases

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Tests for blood alcohol content are not infallible and can be tainted by any number of factors, including human error and faulty equipment. It is for that reason that good DUI defense attorneys never assume that tests results are accurate. Case in point--in recent months, across the country, lab errors have resulted in the dismissal of DUI charges. For example, as reported at denverpost.com, 7 DUI cases were dismissed due to lab errors:

Colorado Springs authorities in December announced the discovery of errors and a review of results at the lab where the alcohol content in blood samples was higher than the true result...In all, the lab retested 7,892 blood alcohol cases dating back to 2006 and found a total of 206 errors. Of the nine affected cases, five defendants had served jail time.

In San Francisco, human error and tampering is alleged to have affected thousands of criminal cases. The lab test problems, which were initially thought to have affected only drug cases, may affect DUI cases as well, as explained in this ABC article:

The public defender's office says the shortcomings which the scandal exposed in the drug unit, may also pertain to DUI testing. They include sloppy work, lack of protocols and inadequate staffing..."One of the most critical pieces of evidence in a driving under the influence case is whether or not the person had alcohol in his system and how much," former San Francisco crime lab director Jim Norris said.

Elsewhere, in Pennsylvania, one county is taking matters into its own hands in order to save money. In Cumberland County, officials have decided to hire a phlebotomist rather than outsource blood alcohol testing. As noted at the Philadelphia DUI Blog, this new arrangement concerns local DUI attorneys:

"I worry about the chain of custody," said a Harrisburg Pa DUI lawyer, referring to the problems in administering the county's part-time blood lab. Indeed, many Pennsylvania lawyers feel that such blood tests, if done at the hands of the county, could pose problems relating to conflicts of interest and impartiality.

Blood alcohol testing is a critical area of concern and plays a key role in the evidentiary burden of the prosecutors. But if the evidence were left in the hands of the county prosecutors, isn't it natural that Pa DUI lawyers would have objection?

Prosecutors and law enforcement officers rely on lab test results to convict people of crimes, such as DUI, which can wrongfully deprive innocent citizens of their liberty if performed incorrectly. For that reason, accurate lab test results are of paramount concern.

The lab testing scandals in Colorado and California and the potential conflicts of interest raised by the newly proposed lab testing scheme in Pennsylvania are clear indications that we still have a long way to go. Innocent people continue to be wrongfully convicted of DUI every day, something that is inexcusable--and entirely preventable.

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