Monday, July 18, 2011

DUI Appeal - defense of unconsciousness as a result of voluntary intoxication

In People of California v. Ferguson, --- Cal.Rptr.3d ----, 2011 WL 1589091 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.) the defendant appealed a DUI causing great bodily harm and a 2d degree murder conviction alleging inter alia that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his request for an instruction on the partial defense of unconsciousness as a result of voluntary intoxication (CALCRIM No. 626), which could have reduced the offense to involuntary manslaughter; (2) evidence of data obtained from his car's event data recorder was improperly admitted.

On February 22, 2008, Michael and Grace Sein were driving home around 11 p.m. They were stopped at a red light at the intersection of MacArthur and Jamboree in Newport Beach, when they were rear-ended by a car driven by Ferguson, a Marine stationed at Camp Pendelton. Michael Sein was killed; Grace Sein was severely injured. Ferguson suffered a broken ankle and some internal injuries. A witness to the accident testified that immediately after the collision, Ferguson looked “normal” but seemed disoriented and confused “like a person [who] was just in an accident.”
The prosecution's accident reconstruction expert opined Ferguson was driving at about 75 miles per hour at the time of impact based on the injuries and the condition and placement of the vehicles. The event data recorder recovered from Ferguson's vehicle showed his car, a Dodge Caliber, was traveling at 75 miles per hour and accelerating when he struck the Seins's car, an Aston–Martin, although acceleration had stopped one-tenth of a second before impact.

Ferguson claimed he drank only two beers that night. Ferguson told Zeeman he was driving to his home in Santa Ana from Camp Pendleton and at Zeeman's request gave a detailed description of the route he would normally drive to get there. Ferguson appeared confused when Zeeman told him he had been driving in the wrong direction from his home.

A blood sample was taken from Ferguson about three hours after the accident. His blood alcohol level measured .12 percent. By extrapolation, Ferguson would have had between a .16 and .17 percent blood alcohol concentration at the time of the accident, or if he was a “tolerant drinker,” it could have been as high as .21 percent.

The defense's evidence included the fact that the defendant suffered PTSD which caused him to self-medicate. He argued that he could use the partial defense of 'voluntary intoxication to the point of unconsciousness' as a basis to obtain a lesser-included instruction for involuntary manslaughter. Rejecting this argument the court stated:

"Here, there was insufficient evidence to support an instruction on unconsciousness as a partial defense. An unconscious act, as defined “within the contemplation of the Penal Code is one committed by a person who because of somnambulism, a blow on the head, or similar cause is not conscious of acting and whose act therefore cannot be deemed volitional.” (citations omitted) Unconsciousness “need not mean that the actor lies still and unresponsive: section 26 describes as ‘[in]capable of committing crimes ...[p]ersons who committed the act ... without being conscious thereof.’ (Italics added.) Thus, unconsciousness ‘ “can exist ... where the subject physically acts in fact but is not, at the time, conscious of acting.” ‘ [Citations.]” ( Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 423–424.)

* * * *
"[T]he trial court did not err by refusing to instruct on unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication. The uncontroverted facts were that Ferguson was aware he was intoxicated, was attempting to sober up, and was focused on getting himself home. He was capable of devising plans to dupe his fellow Marine into retrieving his car keys. He drove a substantial distance prior to the accident without apparent incident. There was insufficient evidence “deserving of consideration that [he] was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication” ( Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 418), when the accident occurred."

As far as the admissibility of the evidence from the EDR (event data recorder) was concerned, Ferguson argued that Vehicle Code section 9951, subdivision (d), precluded admission of the information obtained from an event data recorder in a judicial proceeding. Vehicle Code section 9951 requires the manufacturer of a vehicle equipped with recording devices commonly called “ ‘event data recorders (EDR)’ or ‘sensing and diagnostic modules (SDM),’ “ to disclose its existence in the owner's manual. (Veh.Code, § 9951, subd. (a).) Vehicle Code section 9951, subdivision (c), provides, “Data described in subdivision (b) [FN4] that is recorded on a recording device may not be downloaded or otherwise retrieved by a person other than the registered owner of the motor vehicle, except under one of the following circumstances: [¶] (1) The registered owner of the motor vehicle consents to the retrieval of the information. [¶] (2) In response to an order of a court having jurisdiction to issue the order. [¶] (3) For the purpose of improving motor vehicle safety, including for medical research of the human body's reaction to motor vehicle accidents, and the identity of the registered owner or driver is not disclosed in connection with that retrieved data.... [¶] (4) The data is retrieved by a licensed new motor vehicle dealer, or by an automotive technician ... for the purpose of diagnosing, servicing, or repairing the motor vehicle.” (Italics added.) Vehicle Code section 9951, subdivision (d), upon which Ferguson relies provides, “A person authorized to download or otherwise retrieve data from a recording device pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (c), may not release that data, except to share the data among the motor vehicle safety and medical research communities to advance motor vehicle safety, and only if the identity of the registered owner or driver is not disclosed.” (Italics added.)

The court stated that "the issue is not whether Vehicle Code section 9951 permits admission of EDR data into evidence—as already noted, all relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by statute ( Evid.Code, § 351)—the issue is whether the statute prohibits admission of EDR evidence. And in arguing Vehicle Code section 9951, subdivision (d), precludes use of EDR data in judicial proceedings, Ferguson has taken its language out of context."

Holding that the statute did not exclude the evidence, the court upheld its admissibility, noting that the information was obtained via a search warrant.

The defendant's other contentions were similarly rejected, and the conviction upheld.

Editor's note: The court did mention that there were 4th amendment protections regarding the EDR data:

"[I]n People v. Xinos (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 637 ( Xinos ), is misplaced. Xinos was a Fourth Amendment case. It held “a motorist's subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to her or his own vehicle encompasses the digital data held in the vehicle's [sensing and diagnostic module (SDM) ].” ( Id. at p. 659.) The court concluded the warrantless downloading of the SDM's digital data, a year after the accident and unsupported by probable cause, violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. ( Id. at pp. 659–660.) Accordingly, it held the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to suppress. ( Id. at p. 664.) "

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Saturday, July 16, 2011

DUI Appeal - Illinois Says All Cars That Stop On Shoulder (Even Temporarily) Are Legally Subject to Police Seizures

In People of Illinois v. Dittmar, Nos. 2–09–1112, 2–09–1304, June 15, 2011, Appeal from the Circuit Court of Stephenson County, the parties presnted the following evidence in the police report by stipulation:



[I]f called as a witness, Stephenson County sheriff's deputy Shan MacAdam, the arresting officer, would testify as follows:



“While on routine patrol[,] I was traveling north bound on Route 26 north of McConnell Road when I observed an oncoming south bound vehicle. The vehicle was traveling at a slow speed, [and] the right turn signal was activated a very short distance before the vehicles met. The vehicle, a white Chevrolet Cavalier convertible[,] had slowed greatly and was pulling to the shoulder of the roadway as I passed. The squad [car] was also traveling slowly[,] and I observed a white hat on the head of the driver.



After passing the vehicle[,] I turned the squad [car] around to check if the vehicle was having mechanical problems, or if there were problems with the occupants. As I approached the rear of the car[,] I observed the subject with the white hat walking from the driver door around the rear of the car and to the right passenger door. Another subject from the right side of the car was walking around the rear of the car to the driver door. Both doors were open as they changed sides of the car.



The subject wearing the white hat got into the passenger seat, while a female stood next to the open driver door as she watched the squad [car] stop behind her. She got into the driver seat as I stopped directly behind the white Chevrolet, bearing TX08/777CCJ.



I approached the driver door, which was still open, and immediately noted the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage flowing from the interior.”



The video displayed that, as he pulled onto the shoulder behind defendant's car, the officer activated his overhead emergency lights and gave the dispatcher the make, model, and license plate number of the car.



Reviewing Illinois law, the court stated as follows:



In People v. McDonough, 239 Ill.2d 260, 272 (2010), the supreme court identified a two-prong test for judging whether an encounter qualifies as a community-caretaking endeavor:



“First, law enforcement officers must be performing some function other than the investigation of a crime. [Citations.] In making this determination, a court views the officer's actions objectively. [Citation.] Second, the search or seizure must be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public. [Citation.] ‘Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.’ [Citation.] The court must balance a citizen's interest in going about his or her business free from police interference against the public's interest in having police officers perform services in addition to strictly law enforcement.”



The appeals court further explained that a community caretaking function simply because there is a seizure:



As the supreme court in Luedemann clarified, the community-caretaking doctrine justifies not consensual encounters—which need no justification under the constitution—but seizures. See Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d at 548 (“It is clear, then, that the ‘community caretaking’ doctrine is analytically distinct from consensual encounters and is invoked to validate a search or seizure as reasonable under the fourth amendment.”). The error that Luedemann corrected was at one time prevalent in the appellate court, including this district. For instance, our decision in Lee, which defendant cited below and continues to cite on appeal, committed the error. See Lee, 291 Ill.App.3d at 54 (“Once a seizure has occurred, an officer is not acting in his community caretak[ing] function, even if his original intention had nothing to do with detection or investigation of a crime.).” Lee's conception of community-caretaking encounters was abandoned by this district even before Luedemann was decided in 2006. See People v. Mitchell, 355 Ill.App.3d 1030, 1033 (2nd Dist.2005) (noting that the community-caretaking doctrine “has nothing to do with consensual encounters; for, by their very nature, consensual encounters need no justification. Treating it as synonymous with consensual encounters deprives the doctrine of any analytical content.”).



The court stated the following test: The question * * * is not how regularly the police conduct in question occurs as part of crime detection, investigation, or prevention, but whether the conduct is, in the context at issue, so lacking an objectively grounded public-safety purpose that the officer could not be “performing some function other than the investigation of a crime” ( McDonough, 239 Ill.2d at 272).



Concluding that this case was a proper community caretaking seizure, the court stated:



"We recognize that, unlike in the cases cited by the State, MacAdam did not come upon a vehicle already at rest, without knowledge of how long it had been there ( McDonough, Laake ), or have specific information that the driver might be impaired or in distress ( Robinson ). The vehicle came to a stop while MacAdam observed it, and he had no specific information about the travelers aside from what he saw. Nonetheless, MacAdam had reason to believe that the occupants might need assistance. Even if MacAdam could not be certain that there was an emergency, his lack of certainty had to be weighed against the likelihood that, if he did not stop to inquire, the travelers would not receive assistance for some time, given the rural location. MacAdam had also to consider the potential hazards to the travelers from passing traffic, given that no lights were activated on their car despite the dim ambient light.



"The public interest served by MacAdam's actions more than outweighed the intrusion. See McDonough, 239 Ill.2d at 272 (court must balance a citizen's interest in being free from police intrusion against the public interest in having police perform services in addition to crime detection and prevention); State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537, 543 (Iowa 2003) (“[T]he court must balance the public need and interest against the degree and nature of the intrusion upon the citizen's privacy.”). The video of the stop shows that approximately 36 seconds elapsed between MacAdam's activating his emergency lights and reaching the driver's door of the car—at which point, defendant does not contest, MacAdam made observations that justified further detention of defendant, resulting ultimately in his arrest. There was an ample public-safety justification for those 36 seconds."


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Thursday, July 07, 2011

DWI Appeal - Prosecutor's Document Alteration Nets 1 Year Suspension


In Matter of Danielle Muscatello, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 2624002 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 05812, The respondent was employed as an Assistant District Attorney with the Office of the District Attorney for Kings County. On November 5, 2009, she was presenting evidence to a Kings County Grand Jury in relation to a defendant who had been arrested on October 18, 2009, for driving while intoxicated. As part of the presentation, she moved into evidence a New York City Police Department form known as the Chemical Test Analysis (hereinafter the Form). The Form is an official document that reports, inter alia, the defendant's blood alcohol content at the time the breathalyzer test is performed. The police officer who administered the test is required to certify on the Form that its contents are true, accurate, and complete. After moving the Form into evidence, the respondent realized that it was incomplete, in that the space where the number reflecting the defendant's blood alcohol content should have been, was blank. Nonetheless, the respondent told the Grand Jury that the form reflected a blood alcohol content of .08%, a fact she knew from other evidence previously introduced before the Grand Jury.

On or about November 12, 2009, the respondent subpoenaed the police officer who had prepared the Form. On that date, knowing that her supervisor was out of the office, the respondent entered and searched that office for the Form. The respondent found the Form in her supervisor's briefcase and removed it. She then directed the police officer to fill in the blank to reflect the defendant's blood alcohol content, and returned the altered Form to her supervisor's briefcase without her supervisor's knowledge.

On appeal in this disciplinary matter, the respondent asked the Court to take into consideration the fact that she was a young lawyer who had been practicing law for less than three years, that she panicked in a high-pressure situation and doubted herself, and that the conduct was isolated and aberrational. Further, she maintained that she has been punished enough as she was terminated from her position as an Assistant District Attorney, which she considered to be an ideal job. She is deeply remorseful and ashamed of her misconduct. Numerous character letters were submitted on the respondent's behalf, all of which attested to her reputation for honesty and integrity. The respondent's present employer, who hired her after full disclosure was made to him of the grand jury incident, indicated in a letter that the respondent “consistently has expressed remorse ... and displayed a high standard of ethical and moral character during her employment with me at my firm.”

The Court found that a 1 year suspension was appropriate. " Notwithstanding the respondent's candor, youth, remorse, and lack of a prior disciplinary history, we conclude that the circumstances of this case warrant the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year."


Just as many prosecutors have said about our clients: people are always sorry when they get caught. But the law says they should think about their actions before they commit the act.


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DWI Appeal - Texas Says Cell Phone Use Can't Prove Negligent Homicide Case


In Montgomery v. State of texas, --- S.W.3d ----, 2011 WL 2150230 (Tex.App.-Hous. (14 Dist.)) the defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide after she made an unsafe lane change while using her cellphone. Her lane change occurred while another vehicle was sppeding behind her. By changing lanes, she was rear-ended and caused to hit another vehicle, which then resulted in the death of a passenger. in reversing the conviction, the court stated:

"In Texas, a person commits the offense of criminally negligent homicide if he or she (1) causes the death of an individual, (2) ought to have been aware that his or her conduct created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, and (3) failed to perceive the risk, which is of such a nature and degree that the failure constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person would have exercised under the circumstances. (citations omitted) Accordingly, in order to convict appellant of criminal negligence, the State was required to prove not merely that she did something a person of ordinary prudence would not have done, but that her failure to perceive that a substantial risk of death would result from her conduct grossly deviated from an ordinary standard of care."

In discussing the application of the law to the facts here, the court stated:

"As this court observed in Tello v. State, when courts in Texas have addressed the level of evidence necessary to convict a defendant of criminally negligent homicide resulting from vehicle-related accidents, “speeding, racing, and intoxication often are contributing factors.” (citation omitted) None of these factors is present in the present case."
* * *
At trial in the present case, the State presented evidence of appellant's use of a cell phone while driving, her unsafe lane change, and her failure to maintain a proper lookout. Only one of the three factors was a moving violation under Texas law: making an unsafe lane change.FN5 However, the State placed primary emphasis on a factor that was not even listed in the indictment as proof of appellant's negligence: cell phone usage.FN6 The State analogized using a cell phone while driving to driving while intoxicated, a moving violation subject to substantial criminal penalties. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 49.04, 49.09. However, in doing so, the State could be seen as “legislating through prosecution,” and, by continuing that emphasis in this appeal, the State encourages this court to legislate through judicial fiat. FN7 Except under very limited circumstances not at issue in this case, using a cell phone while driving is not an illegal activity in Texas."

Concluding that the general public lacks knowledge about the dangers of cell phone driving, the court in reversing the convictions stated as follows:

"We do not minimize the fact that Chance Wilcox tragically died in this accident. But Texas law makes clear that the circumstances for assessing criminally negligent homicide are judged from the defendant's perspective at the time of his or her actions, not from hindsight. * * * Supported by additional scientific research and increased public awareness, Texans may one day determine that cell phone usage while operating a vehicle is morally blameworthy conduct that justifies criminal sanctions; however, the State failed to establish that such was the case in March 2008, at the time of this accident."

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Monday, July 04, 2011

DWI Appeal of the Day (DAD) - Anonymous Tip Insufficient for Stop of Driver


In Martinez v. State of Texas --- S.W.3d ----, 2011 WL 2555712 (Tex.Crim.App.) the state charged appellant with driving while intoxicated (DWI) and possession of marijuana. The facts were reported as follows:

"At 10:55 p.m., the police dispatcher radioed that an anonymous caller reported that a male driving a blue Ford pickup truck stopped at the intersection of 17th and Main Streets, put two bicycles into the back of the truck, and drove away westbound. Hurley was on patrol in the general area and spotted a green Ford F–250 truck that “looked like it was blue” FN2 approximately three quarters of a mile away from the site of the reported incident. He began following the truck and called dispatch to confirm the vehicle description. He trailed the truck for four blocks without observing any traffic violations, then stopped the vehicle. As he walked to driver's side of the truck, Officer Hurley noticed, in the truck bed, two bicycles that were not visible to him until he approached the truck. While speaking with appellant, the truck's driver, Hurley detected a strong odor of alcohol and noticed that appellant had bloodshot, glassy eyes."
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. On appeal, the appellate court stated that:

"At a suppression hearing involving an investigatory stop, the state need not establish that a crime occurred prior to the stop, but it must elicit testimony showing sufficient facts to prove that reasonable suspicion existed that a particular person has engaged in, or soon will be engaging in, criminal activity."
When it comes to anonymous tips, this court stated the law applicable as follows:



"When an officer's suspicion of criminal activity arises from an anonymous caller rather than from the officer's own observations, the tip seldom provides reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.FN12 The tip lacks “sufficient indicia of reliability,” such as a suitable level of police corroboration,FN13 to establish the “requisite quantum of suspicion.” FN14 An inverse relationship exists between the reliability of the informant and the amount of corroborated information required to justify the police intrusion; the less reliable the tip, the more information is needed .FN15 However, when the informant provides self-identifying information that makes himself accountable for the intervention, the degree of reliability significantly improves.FN16


The court found the details of the call insufficient to establish both the reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred, and that the driver was the one involved in the complained-of activity:



"As the record indicates, there was neither a complainant nor a report of stolen bicycles. The anonymous caller did not report contextual factors that reasonably connected the unusual activity to a theft, such as witnessing the suspect use bolt cutters to cut a bike lock or stating that the bikes were taken from someone's garage. More than the officer's opinion that an activity is “suspicious” was needed to relate the activity to a criminal act.FN26


"Finally, Officer Hurley had very little information, corroborated or otherwise, to connect appellant to the unusual activity other than the fact that appellant was driving a Ford pickup truck, similar in color to the described truck, close to the time that the unusual activity occurred, and within three quarters of a mile west of the reported incident.FN27 Even though Officer Hurley was informed that the alleged suspect was male, he testified that he would have pulled over a Ford pickup truck driven by a woman. Before he approached the truck after the stop, Officer Hurley did not see any bicycles in the bed of appellant's truck, nor did he have any other reason to stop the truck. The specific, articulable, corroborated facts known by the officer at the time of the stop were minimal."
Concluding, the court held:

"Based on our review of the totality of the circumstances, including the unknown reliability of the anonymous caller and the lack of specific, articulable facts suggesting that criminal activity was afoot, we find that Officer Hurley's investigatory detention of appellant was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's judgments. We reverse the judgments of the court of appeals and remand the causes to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.


Happy Independence Day!



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The Drinking Bra Racks Up Business

The Wine Rack

Designed for only the classiest dames, the Wine Rack is a bra designed to hold the beverage of your choice and, as long as it’s full, adding a little enhancement until the beer goggles kick in. It’s a “drinking system,” so it actually comes complete with a drinking tube, making it easy to take a sip on the go. The drawback, of course, is that carrying 50 liquid ounces around on your chest can be a bit much in plus 90 degree heat. And while it can be inflated with air when the fun is done, people tend to find it strange when cup sizes fluctuate dramatically over the course of an evening.



Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/slideshow/leisure/2011/07/01/fun-and-functional-liquor-luggage/#ixzz1RA6ssmja

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Sunday, July 03, 2011

OWI Appeal - Anonymous Tip OK for Traffic Stop Says Wisconsin Court

In

State of Wisconsin v. Coppens, Slip Copy, 2011 WL 2535535 (Wis.App.), an anonymous caller called into the police on a phone line that did not have caller ID. The caller reported that a male driver of a black car with license plate number 953 NRS had nearly hit him in the parking lot of a market. The caller reported that the man “could hardly walk into the store.”

On appeal, the defense claimed that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because the anonymous telephone tip that led to the stop lacked reliability and the officer only corroborated readily observable innocent details alleged by the caller.

The Wisconsin court described their test for these situations as follows:

"Information from an anonymous caller can create reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop when the caller provides reasonable indicia of reliability. There is no per se rule of reliability, but three factors inform our decision: (1) the caller's veracity; (2) the caller's basis of knowledge; and (3) whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the activity described by the caller describes an imminent threat to public safety. Drunk driving falls into the category of serious threats to public safety, and an officer is not required to wait to personally observe signs of erratic driving or intoxication." (citations omitted)OWI Appeal -

Most courts will find anonymous informers more reliable if they call into phone lines that are known to have Caller ID, or when the complaint is made face-to-face with a police officer, because these people risk being charged with making a false report if they were to lie. Wisconsin took this analysis one step further here:

"[W]e conclude that the caller presented sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the traffic stop. The record contains no reason to believe the caller would have known that the number he called was not equipped with caller identification. He had no basis for knowing how long it would take the police to respond and the officer could have arrived before the caller left the parking lot. Under the circumstances, a caller making a false report would run the risk of being identified and prosecuted if he deliberately lied. See § 946.41 (2009–10). There is also no reason to conclude that the caller purposefully withheld any identifying information or would not have provided his name if he had been asked. Under these circumstances, the record provides no reason to doubt the caller's veracity."

Applying the other factors, the court concluded that the stop was lawful, explaining:

"The caller also demonstrated sufficient basis of knowledge. He reported that he personally observed the driving and the degree of impairment. He reported specific details that showed how he came to know of the illegal activity. Olson was able to confirm that a black car driven by a male with a specific license plate number was present at the location the caller identified within a few minutes of the call. Even if some of these details were “innocent,” they provided Olson with a basis to test the reliability of the anonymous caller. See State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶ 37, 241 Wis.2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 101. If “an informant is right about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990).


Finally, the anonymous caller reported an imminent threat to public safety. Olson stopped Coppens on a busy roadway with both vehicle and pedestrian traffic. He was not required to endanger public safety by delaying the traffic stop until he could independently confirm Coppens' intoxication."


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Saturday, July 02, 2011

DUI Appeal - Design Flaws IN EC-IR Breath Sampling Must Be Allowed at Trial


In People v. Vangelder, --- Cal.Rptr.3d ----, 2011 WL 2583854 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.) the appellate court found in error the trial court's ruling disallowing any expert testimony from defendant that would have presented a physiologist's scientific criticisms of the reliability of the data produced by breath test machines, which are based on the assumption that such devices only measure alveolar (deep lung breath) air.

Defendant's offer of proof from his expert would have provided testimony that this assumption is not always justified, and that a series of physiological factors (e.g., individual breathing patterns, body temperature, blood hematocrit, and breath temperature) may affect the transmission of alcohol in gas form, from the bloodstream to the lower and upper portions of the lungs, to the trachea and mouth and back again, thereby making such breath measurements unreliable, and undermining, in turn, the application of the standardized partition ratio calculation for converting breath levels to blood-alcohol levels.

As the appeals court recognized, "[i]t must be emphasized that defendant is not arguing that the EC/IR breath test device was malfunctioning, out of order, or incorrectly operated, but instead, he challenges the validity of its design, operation, and sampling method."

Due to the excellent summarization of Dr. Hlastala's testimony, and the scientific basis for it, DAD recommends that the reader review the entire opinion for its value to the profession.

The appellate court explained why the expert testimony was admissible as follows:

"Although breath test results are admissible if a reliable foundation for them is laid, we think that such competent evidence of their potential inaccuracy, because of physical variabilities leading to poor data in sampling, should have been allowed to be considered, as going to the weight to be accorded the testing results. (See 90 A.L.R.4th 155, § 2, p. 164.) In light of the authorities described above, we conclude that the trial court was mistaken in stating that this expert testimony was completely irrelevant as an attempt to rebut the breath test result, for either the per se or generic DUI counts. Under section 23610, subdivision (c), this expert provided enough of a foundation to explain why he believes that the breath test samples were not representative, based upon the problems in obtaining the samples that were inherent within the identified variables of an individual's physiology. The expert was proposing that even a correctly operating breath test device would take in samples that were essentially inaccurate and nonrepresentative of breath-alcohol content, which was ultimately to be converted into a blood-alcohol reading through the use of the partition ratio. He did not have to indicate which way the potential inaccuracy would point, as a foundational matter, in order to cast doubt on this part of the testing method. Even a small error could possibly turn a marginally legal reading into an illegal reading. (See 90 A.L.R.4th 155, § 2, p. 161.)"
Concluding that the exclusion was error, the court stated:

"When the court excluded this expert evidence, the error was not harmless because it was “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached” had such evidence been admitted. ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) First, defendant performed well on the physical field sobriety tests. He was driving skillfully and pulled over as soon as the red lights went on. There were identifiable problems with the other two chemical tests given, the PAS test and the blood test, with reference to the timing of administration and the time of driving. Defendant gave a revised drinking history. The jury questioned whether it could convict on a per se count but not a generic count, showing they had some confusion. All of those factors point to probable prejudice in the exclusion of this expert testimony, since it could have shed light upon the accuracy of the EC/IR breath test results or the PAS tests, as they affected the proof of each DUI count charged."


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Friday, July 01, 2011

DUI Appeal - Passenger Busted for Public Intoxication When Car Stops


Posted by Bruce Carton on June 29, 2011 at 04:30 PM from LegalBlogWatch
Responsible Motorist Declines to Drive Drunk, Gets Charged With a Crime Anyway
Stop me when you think you've identified the crime committed by the woman in the facts below:
1. Woman drives to her sister's house.
2. Woman consumes two "tall" beers.
3. Woman's sober friend asks woman to drive him to another person's house.
4. Woman says she is too drunk to drive, but sober friend can drive them both there.
5. Woman and sober friend get in car and head off to other person's house, with woman in passenger seat.
Anybody yell out "Stop" yet? No, not yet? OK, let's add:
6. Police pull over the car driven by sober friend because the license plate light is not working, and see that the woman (who is in the passenger seat) is intoxicated.
How about now? Anyone yelling out "Stop?" Because it is at this point that the Indiana police claim that the woman, Brenda Moore, committed the crime of "public intoxication." Indiana code provides that
It is a Class B misdemeanor for a person to be in a public place or a place of public resort in a state of intoxication caused by the person's use of alcohol or a controlled substance.
The trial court and, as of Tuesday the Indiana Supreme Court, held that under Indiana law, "a vehicle stopped along a highway is in a public place for purposes of the public intoxication statute." Thus, when the police stopped the car in which Moore was a passenger, she became in violation of the statute.
Moore argued that her conviction violated the spirit of the public intoxication statute, and the policy behind it, because she caused no harm or annoyance and "adhered to the popular public service motto 'Don't drink and drive.'" She argued that public policy should "encourage persons who find themselves intoxicated to ride in a vehicle to a private place without fear of being prosecuted for a crime." She further argued that she was essentially being convicted for exercising her freedom to consume alcohol.
But the Indiana Supreme Court rejected these arguments, stating that it was up to the Legislature to determine public policy and that she was convicted not for consuming alcohol but for her "conduct after consumption" (riding as a passenger in a car stopped for a license plate infraction??)
Justice Robert Rucker, my new favorite member of the Indiana Supreme Court, dissented. Rucker wrote that as the purpose of the public intoxication statute is to protect the public from the annoyance caused by intoxicated people, "it is difficult to perceive how this purpose is advanced by declaring that the inside of a closed vehicle traveling along a highway is a public place." He added that "Moore should not suffer a criminal penalty for taking the responsible action of allowing a sober friend to drive her car while she was too intoxicated to do so. I would reverse Moore’s conviction."
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Thursday, June 30, 2011

DUI Appeal - Double Jeopardy Bars Retrial, Says North Dakota

In Day v. Judge Bruce Haskell, --- N.W.2d ----, 2011 WL 2505052 (N.D.), 2011 ND 125, the defendant sought a writ from the Supreme Court of North Dakota to bar a judge from forcing the defendant to be retried. The facts of the case are unusual:
"In April 2010, Day was charged by complaint with driving under the influence of alcohol. A jury trial was held in February 2011. After the jury was empaneled and sworn, the trial court called a brief recess and the attorneys left the courtroom. At some point, Day was alone in the courtroom with the jurors and the bailiff. When the attorneys returned to the courtroom, they witnessed what appeared to be a conversation between the bailiff, the jurors, and Day. The trial court returned to the courtroom and read the opening instructions. After the instructions were read, the State moved for a mistrial based on the communication between the bailiff, the jurors, and Day.

"The trial court, attorneys, and Day met outside the presence of the jury, and Day objected to the State's motion and requested the bailiff testify about the communication. The bailiff testified that some of the jurors were talking about whether pheasants sleep in trees, Day said pheasants often sleep in trees, and the bailiff told the jury about seeing a turkey in a tree. The State renewed its request for a mistrial. Day opposed the motion and requested a curative instruction. The court granted the State's motion for a mistrial and excused the jury.

"On March 10, 2011, Day moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing a second trial was prohibited under Fifth Amendment double jeopardy principles. In April 2011, the trial court, another judge presiding, denied Day's motion to dismiss, finding a mistrial was reasonably necessary."


As stated in the opinion:

"‘The general rule is that a person is put in jeopardy when his trial commences, which in a jury case occurs when the jury is empaneled and sworn, and in a non-jury trial when the court begins to hear evidence.’ “ Linghor, 2004 ND 224, ¶ 20, 690 N .W.2d 201 (quoting State v. Berger, 235 N.W.2d 254, 257 (N.D.1975)). Here, jeopardy attached when the jury was empaneled and sworn.

"However, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit retrial in every case where the first trial has terminated after jeopardy attached but before a verdict is rendered. Linghor, 2004 ND 224, ¶ 20, 690 N.W.2d 201. Whether a defendant may be retried depends on whether a mistrial was properly granted. State v. Voigt, 2007 ND 100, ¶ 12, 734 N.W.2d 787. The basic controlling principles in determining whether a mistrial was properly granted are manifest necessity and the ends of public justice. Id. In United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824), a landmark case construing the Double Jeopardy Clause, the United States Supreme Court said:

We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital cases especially, Courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, in favor of the prisoner. But, after all, they have the right to order the discharge; and the security which the public have for the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the Judges, under their oaths of office."

Concluding, the court stated:
"In this case, the attorneys were briefly afforded an opportunity to be heard on the issue. However, the trial court failed to consider other alternatives before granting the State's motion for a mistrial and the decision was not made after sufficient reflection. The trial court allowed the attorneys to question the bailiff at Day's attorney's request, but in response, the trial court said, “frankly, any conversation would be grounds for a mistrial. So I'm not—I'll allow you to make your record, I don't think that it's going to be particularly helpful.” The issue was raised shortly before 10:49 a.m., and the trial court granted a mistrial at approximately 10:56 a.m. The trial court did not make any findings about juror bias or prejudice. Day's attorney requested a curative instruction, but the trial court failed to consider the request and granted a mistrial. The record indicates the trial court believed a mistrial would be required if there was any conversation between the defendant and the jury. A mistrial is not automatically required when the jury is exposed to improper communication; rather, the court must consider the circumstances of each case and determine if there is a manifest necessity for a mistrial. See United States v. Melius, 123 F.3d 1134, 1138–39 (8th Cir.1997) (the trial court's decision to grant a mistrial when there is a claim of possible juror bias is entitled to deference but the court's decision is not beyond review and the court must act responsibly and deliberately considering the defendant's interests). The trial court's decision to terminate a criminal proceeding after jeopardy has attached should not be taken lightly. Linghor, 2004 ND 224, ¶ 22, 690 N.W.2d 201. In this case, the trial court did not consider any alternatives and the decision was made quickly and without sufficient reflection. The trial court did not engage in the “scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion” required before making its decision.

"Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude granting a mistrial was not manifestly necessary and retrial is constitutionally barred."


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Tuesday, June 28, 2011

DUI Appeal - Source Code Win in Georgia

In Davenport v. State of Georgia, --- S.E.2d ----, 2011 WL 2436668 (Ga.) the trial court denied a request for defendant's request for a certificate requesting the attendance in Georgia of an out-of-state witness, namely the Person in control of the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that the trial court's determination that such a witness was not 'material' employed the wrong standard. The standard announced in the opinion states:
“a material witness is ‘a witness who can testify about matters having some logical connection with the consequential facts, esp. if few others, if any, know about these matters.“
The court then remanded the matter for further proceedings. Of additional interest however, was the concurring opinion, which is reproduced in full herein:
I join fully in the majority opinion and note that it may have two salutary effects. First, in Lattarulo v. State, 261 Ga. 124, 401 S.E.2d 516 (1991), this Court held that the results of breathalyzer tests conducted in accordance with the statutory scheme “may be admitted into evidence without expert testimony regarding the scientific theory behind the operation of the test.” Id. at 127, 401 S.E.2d 516. But the Court also said that “[a]n accused may always introduce evidence of the possibility of error or circumstances that might have caused the machine to malfunction,” with such evidence going to the weight of the breathalyzer results. Id. at 126, 401 S.E.2d 516. Under today's decision, defendants seeking to obtain such evidence from another state must still show the Georgia court that the evidence is “material” to their case as required by OCGA § 24–10–94(a), but they need not make the more demanding showing required by the now-disapproved Court of Appeals' decisions.

Second, by applying the correct “material witness” standard, trial courts may alleviate the due process concerns that may otherwise exist (but are not well presented in this appeal) when the State enacts a statutory scheme in which: (1) evidence usually determinative of the defendant's guilt (e.g., blood alcohol content in a per se DUI prosecution) is tested and reported, not by forensic experts who testify and face cross-examination on the reliability of their methods and the accuracy of their results, but rather by a machine (e.g., the Intoxilyzer 5000) that takes in a specimen from the defendant and, through internal mechanisms and computer code, generates a test report; (2) the machine's computer code is unavailable to the defendant through discovery or compulsory process because the State avoids possessing it in Georgia; (3) the machine's test result is admissible at trial through a witness who can say that he was qualified to operate the machine and it operated as designed (see, e.g., OCGA § 40–6–392(a)), but who has no knowledge about whether the machine was in fact designed to produce reliable and accurate results under the circumstances presented; and (4) the machine uses up the specimen, with nothing maintained for later confirmation or independent testing.
Lastly, the dissenting opinion stated in part:
"[T]here is no merit to Davenport's assertion that the trial court's ruling denies her constitutional rights to compulsory process, confrontation, due process of law, and a fair trial. The contention is based upon the premise that the I–5000 is Davenport's accuser, invoking the constitutional right of confrontation. However, as noted by the State, the I–5000 is simply a tool used by law enforcement to determine the breath-alcohol content of a driver who is suspected of driving under the influence. Davenport was adjudged guilty by the trial court on the basis of evidence, to which Davenport stipulated, some of which was reported by the I–5000 after it was certified to be fully operational. In the context of a challenge to the admission into evidence of an inspection certificate for the Intoxilyzer, this Court has determined that there is no violation of the right of confrontation. Rackoff v. State, 281 Ga. 306, 309(2), 637 S.E.2d 706 (2006); Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 76, 80, 485 S.E.2d 486 (1997); see also Jacobson v. State, 306 Ga.App. 815, 818(4), 703 S.E.2d 376 (2010). This is so, in part, because an inspection certificate, like a computer source code, is not testimonial in nature; it is part of the regular course of business regarding operation of the I–5000, and it is not utilized in an investigatory or adversarial setting or generated in anticipation of the prosecution of a particular defendant. Rackoff v. State, supra at 309(2), 637 S.E.2d 706.


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Sunday, June 26, 2011

DWI Appeal - Texas Jury Instruction on Refusals Flawed

In Galinas v. State of Texas, Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2011 WL 2420858 (Tex.App.-El Paso), the defendant was stopped because he allegedly had a red light illuminating his rear license plate (the law requires white) and because he failed to signal while exiting a private driveway onto a public road. With regard to the light above the plate, the videotape of the stop showed that the light above the plate was actually white, as required by law. Trooper Marquez stated that at the time of the traffic stop, he believed Appellant's failure to signal out of the private driveway constituted a traffic violation. It was ultimately determined that the officer incorrectly believed that Texas law required the use of a signal while turning from a private driveway. He also stopped the vehicle because of a red license plate light. After the traffic stop, Marquez noticed that there was also a white light illuminating the license plate. At the time of the stop, he saw only the red light. A white light illuminating a license plate must be visible from at least fifty feet. With regard to the license plate light, he could not tell whether the light was “white”; he could only tell that it was “faint.” The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

In Texas, apparently the jury is also instructed to decide whether a stop was illegal and whether evidence should therefore be suppressed. The defendant on appeal complained that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to give the requested suppression instruction to the jury (which admittedly correctly stated Texas law):



"If you the jury find that Trooper Diego Marquez illegally stopped the defendant on February 16, 2007, or have any reasonable doubt thereof, you are instructed to exclude all evidence obtained by the trooper from and after the illegal stop from—during your deliberations."



Instead, the jury was wrongfully instructed to the opposite:



"...if you find from the evidence that on the occasion in question the Defendant, JAMES HENRY GELINAS, was driving his vehicle on a public road immediately preceding his stop and detention by the officer and you find from the evidence that his vehicle failed to comply with the Texas Transportation Code Provision, which requires a white light to illuminate the vehicle's license plate or you have a reasonable doubt thereof, then such stopping of the accused would be illegal and, if you find the facts so to be, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will disregard this testimony of Trooper Marquez relative to his stopping the defendant and his conclusions drawn as a result thereof, and you will not consider such evidence for any purpose whatsoever."



The State argued on appeal that, even though the jury instruction was wrong, the arguments of counsel corrected the defect. In rejecting that argument, the court wrote:



"The Hutch majority quickly rejected the contention that legal arguments could cure charge error:



The United States Supreme Court, when faced with the assertion that a prosecutor's argument on a presumption of innocence cures a jury charge deficient in that instruction, wrote ‘arguments of counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court.’ [Citation deleted]. And, we have similarly noted that ‘jury argument is not a substitute for a proper jury charge.’


Id. at 173–74. The majority then recognized that because the application paragraph was so flawed as to charge the jury on the opposite of what the law actually provides and because the legality of the stop was a hotly contested issue, the error could not be cured by jury arguments. Id. at 174. Because the error vitally affected Hutch's defensive theory, the court reversed and remanded.

The right to a trial by jury in criminal matters is among those fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitutions. In order to effectuate this valuable right, there is a minimal requirement that the instructions to the jury not be exactly opposite of what the law actually is."



Due to the error, the appeals court reversed and remanded for a new trial.


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Thursday, June 23, 2011

DWI Appeal - US Supremes Bar Blood Test Without Actual Analyst Testimony

In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the government sought to introduce a blood test without having the analyst who performed the actual test appear and testify in court. The United States Supreme Court held that such a technique violates the Confrontation Clause, and reversed the conviction.

Here is the Summary from the court:

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 59, this Court held that the Clause permits admission of “[t]estimonialstatements of witnesses absent from trial . . . only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Later, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu-setts, 557 U. S. ___, the Court declined to create a “forensic evidence” exception to Crawford, holding that a forensic laboratory report, cre-ated specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal proceeding, ranked as “testimonial” for Confrontation Clause purposes. Absent stipula-tion, the Court ruled, the prosecution may not introduce such a re-port without offering a live witness competent to testify to the truth of the report’s statements. 557 U. S., at ___.

Petitioner Bullcoming’s jury trial on charges of driving while intoxicated (DWI) occurred after Crawford, but before Melendez-Diaz. Principal evidence against him was a forensic laboratory report certi-fying that his blood-alcohol concentration was well above the threshold for aggravated DWI. Bullcoming’s blood sample had been tested at the New Mexico Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD), by a forensic analyst named Caylor, who completed, signed, and certified the report. However, the prosecution neither called Caylor to testify nor asserted he was unavailable; the record showed only that Caylor was placed on unpaid leave for an undisclosed reason. In lieu of Caylor, the State called another analyst, Razatos, to validate the report. Razatos was familiar with the testing device used to analyze Bullcoming’s blood and with the laboratory’s testing procedures, but had neither participated in nor observed thetest on Bullcoming’s blood sample. Bullcoming’s counsel objected, asserting that introduction of Caylor’s report without his testimonywould violate the Confrontation Clause, but the trial court overruled the objection, admitted the SLD report as a business record, and permitted Razatos to testify. Bullcoming was convicted, and, while his appeal was pending before the New Mexico Supreme Court, this Court decided Melendez-Diaz. The state high court acknowledged that the SLD report qualified as testimonial evidence under Melendez-Diaz, but held that the report’s admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause because: (1) certifying analyst Caylor was a mere scrivener who simply transcribed machine-generated test re-sults, and (2) SLD analyst Razatos, although he did not participate intesting Bullcoming’s blood, qualified as an expert witness with re-spect to the testing machine and SLD procedures. The court affirmed Bullcoming’s conviction.

147 N. M. 487, 226 P. 3d 1, reversed and remanded.

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to all but Part IV and footnote 6. The Confrontation Clause, the opinion concludes, does not permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification, made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial, through the in-court testimonyof an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of the test reported in the certification. The accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made thecertification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist. Pp. 8–16.

(a)If an out-of-court statement is testimonial, it may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made thestatement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront that witness. Pp. 8–14.

(i)Caylor’s certification reported more than a machine-generated number: It represented that he received Bullcoming’s blood sampleintact with the seal unbroken; that he checked to make sure that the forensic report number and the sample number corresponded; that he performed a particular test on Bullcoming’s sample, adhering to a precise protocol; and that he left the report’s remarks section blank,indicating that no circumstance or condition affected the sample’s in-tegrity or the analysis’ validity. These representations, relating to past events and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are meet for cross-examination. The potential ramifi-cations of the state court’s reasoning, therefore, raise red flags. Most witnesses testify to their observations of factual conditions or events.Where, for example, a police officer’s report recorded an objective fact such as the read-out of a radar gun, the state court’s reasoning would permit another officer to introduce the information, so long as he orshe was equipped to testify about the technology the observing officer deployed and the police department’s standard operating procedures. As, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 826, makes plain, however, such testimony would violate the Confrontation Clause. The comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial report does notdispense with the Clause. Crawford, 541 U. S., at 62. The analysts who write reports introduced as evidence must be made available forconfrontation even if they have “the scientific acumen of Mme. Curieand the veracity of Mother Teresa.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U. S., at ___,n. 6. Pp. 10–11.

(ii)Nor was Razatos an adequate substitute witness simply be-cause he qualified as an expert with respect to the testing machine and the SLD’s laboratory procedures. Surrogate testimony of thekind Razatos was equipped to give could not convey what Caylor knew or observed about the events he certified, nor expose any lapses or lies on Caylor’s part. Significantly, Razatos did not know why Caylor had been placed on unpaid leave. With Caylor on the stand, Bullcoming’s counsel could have asked Caylor questions designed toreveal whether Caylor’s incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty ac-counted for his removal from work. And the State did not assert that Razatos had any independent opinion concerning Bullcoming’s blood alcohol content. More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination. Although the purpose of Sixth Amendment rights is to ensure a fairtrial, it does not follow that such rights can be disregarded because,on the whole, the trial is fair. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145. If a “particular guarantee” is violated, no substituteprocedure can cure the violation. Id., at 146. Pp. 11–14.

(b)Melendez-Diaz precluded the State’s argument that introduction of the SLD report did not implicate the Confrontation Clause because the report is nontestimonial. Like the certificates in Melendez-Diaz, the SLD report is undoubtedly an “affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact” in a criminal proceeding. 557 U. S., at ___. Created solely for an “evidentiary purpose,” id., at ___, the report ranks as testimonial. In all material respects, the SLD report resembles the certificates in Melendez-Diaz. Here, as there, an officer provided seized evidence to a state laboratory required by law to assist in police investigations. Like the Melendez-Diaz analysts, Caylor tested the evidence and prepared a certificateconcerning the result of his analysis. And like the Melendez-Diaz
certificates, Caylor’s report here is “formalized” in a signed document, Davis, 547 U. S., at 837, n. 2. Also noteworthy, the SLD report formcontains a legend referring to municipal and magistrate courts’ rulesthat provide for the admission of certified blood-alcohol analyses.Thus, although the SLD report was not notarized, the formalities at-tending the report were more than adequate to qualify Caylor’s assertions as testimonial. Pp. 14–16.

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DWI Appeal - Confrontation Clause Applies in Probation Revocation Hearing Too

In the fourth of a series of cases involving the right of confrontation, the next case discusses the right of confrontation under the Due Process Clause of the 14th amendment (as opposed to the 6th Amendment right of confrontation found in Melendez-Diaz). The case of Henderson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, --- S.E.2d ----, 2011 WL 2447084 (Va.App.) involved the admissibility of evidence of other crimes committed while the defendant was on probation, allegedly in violation of the right of confrontation under the due process clause.
During the hearing, the only evidence offered in support of any of the alleged violations of the conditions of probation was the testimony of Detective Rosa Ortiz (“Ortiz”) who testified regarding two alleged robberies that she had investigated in October 2009. No charges were brought against Henderson in connection with one of these robberies, and the other robbery charge was nolle prosequied. During the Commonwealth's questioning of Ortiz, Henderson's counsel objected to her testimony regarding what the witnesses in both cases told her, as hearsay in violation of the Confrontation clause.
The Virginia court first explained the type of 'confrontation' one is entitled to under the 14th amendment. “The Sixth Amendment right is limited to ‘criminal prosecutions,’ and a revocation hearing is not a ‘criminal prosecution.’“ Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 417 n. 1, 663 S.E.2d at 550 n. 1 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). “[B]oth the United States Supreme Court and this Court have ... held that probation revocation hearings are not a stage of criminal prosecution and therefore a probationer is not entitled to the same due process protections afforded a defendant in a criminal prosecution.” Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 417, 663 S.E.2d at 550 (citing Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 81, 84, 402 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1991)); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).FN7 However, “[p]robation revocation, like parole revocation, ... does result in a loss of liberty. Accordingly ... a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer.” Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782; see Davis, 12 Va.App. at 84, 402 S.E.2d at 686. In Morrissey, the United States Supreme Court required that the following “minimum requirements of due process” for a revocation hearing be provided:

(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation]; (b) disclosure to the [probationer] of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need to be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation].
408 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added).


As stated by the Virginia court herein:

“Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has stated that in revocation hearings ‘formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed,’ Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 789, and that the process of revocation hearings ‘should be flexible enough to consider evidence ... that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial,’ Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.” Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 421, 663 S.E.2d at 552. “Thus, hearsay evidence, which would normally be inadmissible in a criminal trial, may be admitted into evidence in a revocation hearing based on the court's discretion,” id. (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489), if the circuit court “specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation,” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added). Neither our Supreme Court nor this Court have squarely addressed what constitutes “good cause” for denial of the due process right of confrontation in the wake of the many changes wrought by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and its progeny's construction of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
The Virginia court found that:
“[i]t is entirely clear from the circumstances [in this case] that the interrogation[s were] part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct,” Davis, 547 U.S. at 829, and thus the primary purpose of the interrogations was “ ‘for the purpose of establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,’ “ Crawford, 281 Va. at 98, 704 S.E.2d at 116 (alterations in original) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). As stated, the challenged evidence in the present case is a detective's testimony that included, and was based on, information provided to her by witnesses during her investigation of two alleged robberies after they had occurred—“ ‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’ “ Melendez–Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2531 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).

Having found that the witness' statements were testimonial, the Va. court then determined whether there was 'good cause' to suspend the right of confrontation. The Virginia court noted that, in determining whether to admit testimonial hearsay evidence under the “good cause” exception, other courts have adopted either of two methods in determining whether evidence admitted at a probation revocation hearing violated the limited due process right to confrontation and cross-examination. In Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ind.2007), the Indiana Supreme Court explained both methods:

"In one, the trial court employs a balancing test that weighs the probationer's interest in confronting a witness against the interests of the State in not producing the witness. E.g., United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 844–45 (8th Cir.2004). In the balancing test, the State is required to show good cause for denying confrontation. See United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.2005). In another test, the trial court determines whether the evidence reaches a certain level of reliability, or if it has a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness. E.g., United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir.2006). The requirement, found in Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, that the trial court find “good cause” before denying the right to confrontation plays an explicit role when a trial court performs a balancing test; however, this does not mean that Morrissey's good cause requirement is not addressed in the substantial trustworthiness test.... [T]he substantial trustworthiness test implicitly incorporates good cause into its calculus.

Under the reliability test, “the trial court determines whether the evidence reaches a certain level of reliability, or if it has a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness,” and “the substantial trustworthiness test implicitly incorporates good cause into its calculus.” Reyes, 868 N.E.2d at 441 (citations omitted); see also Kelley, 446 F.3d at 692; Crawford v. Jackson, 323 F.3d 123, 131 (D.C.Cir.2003); Hampton v. State, 203 P.3d 179, 184–85 (Okla.Crim.App.2009). “Hearsay evidence has been held admissible in federal probation and parole revocation proceedings where the evidence is ‘demonstrably reliable.’ “ Turner, 278 Va. at 742, 685 S.E.2d at 667 (quoting McCallum, 677 F.2d at 1026). In Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir.2010), the court noted the following “[e]xamples of evidence possess[ed] recognized indicia of reliability”:

(1) the conventional substitutes for live testimony (e.g., affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence), (2) statements falling under an established exception to the hearsay rule, (3) statements corroborated by detailed police investigative reports, and (4) statements corroborated by the releasee's own statements. See [ Scarpelli], 411 U.S. at 782 n. 5; Prellwitz v. Berg, 578 F.2d 190, 193 (7th Cir.1978) (evidence falling under the “business record” hearsay exception is reliable); Jackson, 323 F.3d at 130–31 (evidence corroborated by observations in a police investigative report is reliable); McCallum, 677 F.2d at 1026 (evidence corroborated by the releasee's testimony is reliable).
Applying the reliability test, the Virginia Court found that the testimony was not so reliable so as to excuse confrontation:
"In turning to the facts in this case, Ortiz's hearsay testimony regarding both alleged crimes based solely on her conversations with the witnesses does not rise to the level of demonstrable reliability required for admissibility. The hearsay statements used to establish that Henderson violated the conditions of probation meet no firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule that implies their inherent reliability. In addition, the record does not convey whether Ortiz was speaking purely from her memory in conveying the statements of the witnesses, or whether she was utilizing a police report or her notes thus further diminishing the reliability of her testimony. See Comito, 177 F.3d at 1171 (concluding that “[u]nsworn verbal allegations are, in general, the least reliable type of hearsay ...”); United States v. Pratt, 52 F.3d 671, 677 (7th Cir.1995) (holding the officer's hearsay testimony was reliable because it was consistent with the written statements of the victim in addition to other corroborating information).

Concluding, the court stated: "Because the out-of-court statements made to Ortiz were neither inherently reliable by satisfying a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule nor were the statements corroborated by other evidence presented at the revocation hearing, the hearsay evidence offered by Ortiz does not rise to the level of being so demonstrably reliable that Henderson's limited right to confrontation in a probation revocation hearing should have been denied."
"[U]nder the balancing test, the court “weighs the probationer's interest in confronting a witness against the interests of the State in not producing the witness,” and the “State is required to show good cause for denying confrontation.” Continuing, the court stated:
"Henderson's interest in confronting the witnesses was high in that the nature of the statements was “ ‘detailing the specific criminal wrongdoing of the defendant’ “ in crimes that he denied any involvement in. Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 419, 663 S.E.2d at 551 (quoting Jasper v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 749, 755, 644 S .E.2d 406, 410 (2008)); see also McCormick, 54 F.3d at 222 (“It follows, therefore, that a releasee's interest in cross-examining a laboratory technician regarding a scientific fact is less than would be his interest, for example, in confronting a hearsay declarant regarding what the declarant may have seen. The truth of the former can be verified through methods of science; the truth of the later can best be verified through the rigor of cross-examination, conducted under the circumspect eye of the district court.”).
The court found against the State under the balancing test as well:
"In short, the record reflects no reason advanced by the Commonwealth as to what governmental interest was served by not producing the witnesses against Henderson. Thus, Henderson's interest in confronting the witnesses who spoke with Ortiz necessarily outweighed the interest of the Commonwealth in not producing them. In this case, the Commonwealth neither satisfied Henderson's due process right to confront the adverse witnesses against him nor adequately justified its failure to do so. Curtis, 626 F.3d at 548 (“Instead of hindering Curtis's ability to test the victim's statements, the government did as much as it could to facilitate it.”). Thus, the circuit court could not, and therefore did not, balance Henderson's interest in confronting the witnesses against him against any interest the Commonwealth may have had in denying Henderson that right.
As a result, the sentence following the revocation hearing was reversed, and the matter was remanded for a new hearing.


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Wednesday, June 22, 2011

OUI Appeal - Mass. Court Says Registry Records Violate Confrontation Clause

In our 3rd installment of a 3-day series on government records - admissibility and confrontation - is a case provided by Lloyd Boyer and Thomas Workman. In Commonwealth v. Parenteau, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that certain RMV records were admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The document in question was actually a certificate from the registry of motor vehicles (registry) attesting to the fact that a notice of license suspension or revocation was mailed to the defendant, Peter L. Parenteau, on May 2, 2007:

"The thrust of the defendant's argument is that the admission in evidence of the registry certificate, in the absence of testimony from a registry witness, violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The defendant contends that the certificate was created exclusively for trial so the Commonwealth could prove a fact necessary to convict him, namely, that he had been notified of the ten-year revocation of his driver's license. Because he challenged such notice, the defendant continues, any attested document that served as evidence to the contrary was a testimonial statement that was subject to cross-examination. We agree."

The court discussed the basic confrontation clause prohibition:

"[T]he United States Supreme Court held that the out-of-court "[t]estimonial" statements of a witness are inadmissible at trial except where the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The Court stated that the confrontation clause applies to "witnesses" against the accused, "in other words, those who 'bear testimony.' " Id. at 51, quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828). " 'Testimony,' in turn, is typically '[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.' " Crawford v. Washington, supra, quoting Webster, supra. Although the Supreme Court declined to articulate a "comprehensive definition" of "testimonial" statements, Crawford, supra at 68, it did describe various formulations of the "core class" of such statements:

"[ (1) ] ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent--that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially[; (2) ] 'extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions'[; or (3) ] statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial."

Explaining why this particular document violated the confrontation clause (as opposed to other RMV records), the court explained:

"We conclude that the registry certificate, like a certificate of drug analysis, is testimonial in nature. It is a solemn declaration made by the registrar for the purpose of establishing the fact that a notice of license revocation was mailed to the defendant on May 2, 2007, and, by inference, was received by him. The registry certificate was dated July 24, 2009, nearly two months after the criminal complaint for operating a motor vehicle after license revocation had issued against the defendant. As such, it plainly was made for use at the defendant's trial as prima facie evidence that he was notified of his license revocation, an essential element of the charged crime that the Commonwealth was required to prove. The certificate did not simply attest to the existence and authenticity of records kept by the registry but made a factual representation based on those records that a particular action had been performed--notice had been mailed on a specified date. See, e.g., State v. Jasper, 158 Wash.App. 518, 531-532 (2010) (affidavit from legal custodian of driving records attesting that records showed that defendant's driver's license was suspended on particular day was testimonial for confrontation clause purposes). The mere existence of a copy of the notice of license revocation in the registrar's files did not, in and of itself, constitute proof that it was mailed to the defendant. Because the certificate is a testimonial statement, its admission at trial in the absence of testimony from a registry witness violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation."

In rejecting the State's argument that the attestation was a business record, the court stated:

"[T]he Court pointed out in Melendez-Diaz, supra at 2538, that business records are not admissible at trial "if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial." See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943) (holding that accident report provided by railroad company employee did not qualify as business record where essentially prepared for use "in litigating, not in railroading"). It followed, therefore, that a clerk "was permitted 'to certify to the correctness of a copy of a record kept in his office,' but had 'no authority to furnish, as evidence for the trial of a lawsuit, his interpretation of what the record contains or shows, or to certify to its substance or effect.' " Melendez-Diaz, supra at 2539, quoting State v. Wilson, 141 La. 404, 409 (1917). The Court in Melendez-Diaz further explained that "[b]usiness and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because--having been created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial-- they are not testimonial." Melendez-Diaz, supra at 2539-2540. See Commonwealth v. Weeks, 77 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 5-7 (2010) (holding that admission in evidence of certified copies of docket sheets of defendant's prior convictions did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because such records are not testimonial). Thus, when determining the admissibility of a particular business record, a court must examine carefully the purpose for which it was created. See id. at 5.

"We agree with the Commonwealth that the actual notice of the defendant's license revocation, dated May 2, 2007, constitutes a business record of the registry, created and kept in the ordinary course of its affairs. [FN9] However, there is no evidence of the existence of a contemporaneous business record showing that the notice was mailed on that date. If such a record had been created at the time the notice was mailed and preserved by the registry as part of the administration of its regular business affairs, then it would have been admissible at trial. That would have been the correct procedure for the admission of a business record from the registry. Here, however, the only evidence that the notice was mailed to the defendant is the registry certificate dated July 24, 2009, three months before trial, attesting to that fact. Such certificate was not created as part of the administration of the registry's regular business affairs, but for the purpose of establishing an essential fact at trial. Accordingly, the registry certificate did not constitute a nontestimonial business record."

Concluding that the admission of the certificate of service was improperly admitted, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.


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Tuesday, June 21, 2011

DUI Appeal - Ohio Says BMV Records Violate law

This is the second installment in a three-part DAD discussion of government records admissibility and/or confrontation clause issues. The case of State of Ohio v. Lee, 191 Ohio App.3d 219, 945 N.E.2d 595, 2010 -Ohio- 6276, was provided to DAD by NCDD member Jeff Meadows. Here, the defendant appealed his conviction based in part on the alleged erroneous admission of defendant's Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) record (transcript) which was used to prove five prior OVI convictions. The appeals court agreed, and held that the records were not sufficiently 'certified' to allow them to be introduced under particular business records or public records exceptions. Since they were not so 'certified', the court held that their admission without live testimony to otherwise authenticate the documents violated the confrontation clause.
In Ohio, Evid.R. 901 provides that authentication or identification of a piece of evidence is a condition precedent to the admissibility of that evidence. Evid.R. 902 lists certain items that are self-authenticating so as to negate the need for any extrinsic evidence in support of the item's admissibility. An item that is not self-authenticating must be properly authenticated by other means.
The defendant on appeal argued that the transcript was neither properly certified nor sufficient to be self-authenticating because it was not authenticated by a live witness and did not contain a notarization, signature, or affidavit from an individual at the BMV. According to the court's recital of the evidence:

"The transcript in this case is accompanied by a cover page stating that “[t]his certifies that a search has been made of the files and records of the Ohio Registrar of Motor Vehicles; that the attached documents are true and accurate copies of the files or records of the Registrar; and that the Registrar's official seal has been affixed in accordance with the Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 4501.34(A), which states in part: ‘[The Registrar] shall adopt a seal bearing the inscription: Motor Vehicle Registrar of Ohio. The seal shall be affixed to all writs and authenticated copies of records, when it has been so attached, such copies shall be received in evidence with the same effect as other public records. All courts shall take judicial notice of the seal.’ ” Further, the cover page contains an official seal, which was printed on the document."

In holding that the record was inadmissible, the court stated:

"However, no individual or employee of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles is identified on the document as certifying the record and there is no signature, notarization, or affidavit attesting to the record's authenticity. The cover page contains a notation indicating that the record may have been created “By: TVNSICKL.” Yet no further information is given to suggest the identity of this individual, the individual's position at the BMV, or the individual's knowledge of appellant's driving record. Absent such information and a signature attesting to the record's authenticity, the document does not qualify as a certified record under R.C. 2945.75(B). Moreover, R.C. 4501.34(A) allows for BMV records to be admitted into evidence, but it similarly requires that these records be “authenticated.” Without identification of an individual attesting to the record's authenticity or a signature providing for the records authenticity, no “authentication” exists. See Evid.R. 901. Like the state in McCallum, the prosecution in this case attempted to introduce appellant's BMV record through the testimony of the arresting officer, but, as in McCallum, the officer is not an individual capable of authenticating the record because he had no personal knowledge of the contents of the exhibit."

As far as the inadmissibility of the document under the other statutory provisions, the court stated:
Further, Evid.R. 902 allows certain types of evidence to be admitted as self-authenticating. The BMV record in this case does not qualify under any category of self-authenticating evidence. The applicable provisions of Evid.R. 902 under which a BMV record could arguably qualify provide as follows:

“(1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a seal purporting to be that of * * * any State * * * or of a political subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution.

“(2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A document purporting to bear the signature in the official capacity of an officer or employee of any entity included in paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a public officer having a seal and having official duties in the district or political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies under seal that the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine. * * *

“(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any law of a jurisdiction, state or federal, or rule prescribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. * * *

“(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner **603 provided by law by a notary public or other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments. * * *

“(10) Presumptions created by law. Any signature, document, or other matter declared by any law of a jurisdiction, state or federal, to be presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic.”

The appeals court explained why the document did not qualify as a self-authenticating document as follows:

"Subsections (1) and (2) of Evid.R. 902 both require an accompanying signature. As described above, the BMV record in this case bears no signature. Subsection (4) states that the record must be accompanied by an acknowledgement from a “custodian or other person authorized to make the certification.” There is no indication on the BMV record that a custodian or authorized individual certified the record. The section also refers to subsections (1), (2), and (3), which require accompanying signatures. Subsections (8) and (10) refer to documents executed or declared by law to be authentic. In this case, the applicable Ohio law for authenticating BMV records is R.C. 4501.34(A). As previously discussed, the BMV record does not comply with R.C. 4501.34(A). Accordingly, the BMV record submitted in this case does not qualify as a self-authenticating document under Evid.R. 902."




Editor's Note: In a prior case mentioned in the opinion (McCallum) the cover page certification document contained a name but not a seal, whereas here the cover page contained a seal but not a name. Over the course of time it appears that both the Bureau of Motor Vehicles became lazy with the certifications, until they simply failed to strictly comply with the law. It would be prudent, in light of the above, to review your own Motor Vehicle documents to see if the same deficiencies exist.


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Monday, June 20, 2011

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OUI Appeal - Mass. Court Bars Probation Records Under Confrontation Clause

There appears to be a plethora of decisions recently involving the use and admission of certain records of prior convictions maintained by state agencies. Over the next 3 days, DAD will feature these decisions. Today's decision was provided by NCDD member Greg Oberhauser. In Commonwealth v. Ellis 10-P-419, the defendant was convicted of his fourth OUI offense.

The defendant's primary appellate challenges revolved around the admission of RMV records and of probation records of the South Boston Division of the District Court Department [FN1] during the subsequent offense trial. By exhibit A-1, the Commonwealth moved to introduce the certified docket of a 1990 conviction from that court to prove that the defendant previously had been convicted of OUI as a third offense. See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 447 Mass. 593, 599 (2006) ("A judgment of conviction for a third offense may appropriately be relied on to establish culpability for the first two offenses"). By exhibit A-2, the Commonwealth also moved to introduce a 2008 document entitled "Certification of Probation Information and Prior OUI Offense" and signed by an officer of that court's probation department who did not testify at trial. The probation document, among other things, indicated that a Norman A. Ellis, Jr., of a certain date of birth, address, and Social Security number, had been convicted in 1990 of OUI as a third offense. Finally, by exhibit A-6, the Commonwealth moved to enter various RMV records, whose preparers did not testify, as evidence of the defendant's identity as the prior offender. The defendant did not object to the certified conviction record, but did object to the RMV record and the probation certification based on the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial judge admitted all three exhibits.

On appeal, the court addressed the admissibility of exhibit A-1, the certified conviction record, the court stated:

"Certified court records of conviction are admissible under a hearsay exception for business records. Moreover, "[b]usiness and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation ... because-- having been created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial--they are not testimonial" (citing to Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2539-2540)

With regard to exhibit A-2, the probation record, the court held:

"[T]here was error under Melendez-Diaz in the admission of the probation certification. This record does not qualify as a nontestimonial business record under Melendez-Diaz. Rather, this record, which was generated on June 24, 2008, has every appearance of having been prepared in anticipation of litigation--the litigation being the defendant's criminal trial for OUI as a fourth offense, which is the subject of this appeal. [FN6] In fact, the certification is addressed, as if it were a memorandum, to the assistant district attorney who would be the prosecutor. A record such as this, even if generated in the ordinary course of probation department business, is "prepared specifically for use at [the defendant's] trial" and is testimonial, "[w]hether or not [it] qualif[ies] as [a] business or official record[ ]." Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2540. See Commonwealth v. Shangkuan, 78 Mass.App.Ct. at 832."

With regard to exhibit A-6, the Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) records, the court held:

"The defendant objected at trial to, and challenges in this appeal, the introduction of the RMV records. The contention that there was a Melendez-Diaz error in admission of these registry records, which list motor vehicle registration history, is unavailing. The registration records are kept in the ordinary course of the business of the RMV and were admissible as business records and as summaries of records regularly maintained by the registry of motor vehicles. * * * Unlike the certificates at issue in Melendez-Diaz, which are created solely to prove an element of the prosecution's case, RMV records are maintained independent of any prosecutorial purpose and are therefore admissible in evidence as ordinary business records under G.L. c. 233, § 78, as well as pursuant to G.L. c. 233, § 76")."

In affirming the conviction, the trial court concluded that:

"Notwithstanding the Melendez-Diaz error in the admission of exhibit A-2, the probation certification, we conclude that the introduction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because a certified copy of the conviction was introduced as exhibit A-1."

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