DUI Appeal of the Day (DAD) - The “blackout” defense

The case of Mahanes v. Shugars, --- S.W.3d ----, 2011 WL 43302 (Ky.App.) is not a DUI case. It is a personal injury lawsuit where Mahanes admitted causing the collision that injured the plaintiff. The defendant alleged he suffered a blackout that caused him to lose control of his car and eventually strike Mahanes' truck, and was therefore not responsible for the accident. In Kentucky, this is known as the 'blackout defense'. Many states have such a defense, which relieves the defendant of civil liability.

Under the “blackout” defense,

"where the driver of a motor vehicle suddenly becomes physically or mentally incapacitated without warning, he is not liable for injury resulting from the operation of the vehicle while so incapacitated. However, once a prima facie case of negligence has been made against the defendant he must demonstrate that the sudden illness or incapacity could not have been anticipated or foreseen."

Trial evidence covering two days showed Shugars' blood pressure was 240/136 soon after the crash. He was treated for hypertension, kidney failure and swelling of the brain. The jury

Editor's thoughts: If a 'blackout' can be used to avoid civil liability, then proof of a blackout (as opposed to intoxication) should have an equal or better footing in a criminal DUI case... just thinking....

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DUI Appeal of the Day (DAD) - Judgment of acquittal based on the margin of error

In Kansas v. Finch, --- P.3d ----, 2011 WL 43926 (Kan.) the defendant was arrested for DUI and took a breath test, the result of which was 0.08. The trial proceeded solely on the charge of driving with a BrAC of 0.08 or greater. At trial, the defense crossed the breath operator about the margin of error (for those with interest, the below opinion contains a great portion of the cross, which revealed a recalcitrant cop who was unwilling to admit that the machine was less than 100% perfect). When the state rested, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal as a matter of law (this was a jury trial). The trial court, commenting that he found the breath cop less than credible on the margin of error, and also noting that he was aware of testimony from other trials where the margin of error was admitted to be =/- 0.007, granted the motion.


On appeal, the higher court found the trial courts ruling improper. Under the standards applicable, once the state puts in a result of 0.08 or more, then they have met their initial burden of proof (prima facie in a light most favorable to the State). In reversing though, the appeals court rejected the state's attempt to bar introduction of any evidence of a margin of error or other errors in the measurement of the breath (commenting that the state is trying to "overegg the pudding"). In fact, the court held that the margin of error, if proven, should be considered by the trier of fact in arriving at a verdict at the close of all evidence. The court suggested that the jury could accept or reject the margin of error evidence.



Editors notes: there is controversy over whether a margin of error can defeat a per se count as a matter of law. Further, the appeals court advised that it is improper for a trial court to take notice of testimony dehors the record.

Counsel should always be prepared to prove up a margin of error independent of the breath operators testimony, such as manufacturer's records, government studies, or experts.

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DUI Appeal of the Day - Drunk Driving Laws and Americans with Disabilities Act

In Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 34 NDLR P 107, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 371 (2007), the defendant was a deaf person, who sued after being wrongfully arrested for DUI. He claimed that the police officer's procedures for arrest and custody violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA). The appeals court held that:

(1) To take reasonable steps to accommodate the disability of profoundly deaf motorist who had been arrested for driving under the influence (DUI), as required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), arresting officer had to take appropriate steps to ensure that his communication with motorist was as effective as with other individuals arrested for DUI. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 202, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132.
(2) waiting for oral interpreter before taking field sobriety tests was not reasonable modification of police procedures, in which officer who stopped motorist on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) had to engage to accommodate motorist's profound deafness;
(3) Actual communication between police officer and deaf motorist whom he had stopped on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) was not so ineffective that oral interpreter was necessary to guarantee that motorist was on equal footing with DUI suspects who were not hearing-impaired, and to protect motorist's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), where motorist admitted that he read lips and usually understood 50% of what was said, where officer, in addition to verbal instructions, gave physical demonstrations, and where motorist understood that he was being asked to perform field sobriety tests and actually tried to perform at least three of those tests; and
(4) Arresting officer took steps reasonably necessary to establish effective communication at police station with the profoundly deaf motorist whom he arrested for driving under the influence (DUI), and did not discriminate against motorist in violation of provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), where officer not only read consent form aloud to motorist twice in lighted room to afford him an opportunity to lip read, but provide him with written copy of form, and where motorist acknowledged that he could read English; motorist's own failure to read what officer provided him did not constitute discrimination.
(5) Even assuming that corrections officers failed to accommodate motorist's disability, by requiring him to use ordinary telephone to attempt to communicate his arrest to his girlfriend, this lack of accommodation did not injure motorist or support cause of action under the ADA.

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DUI Appeal of the Day - Collateral Estoppel OK for Wyoming DUI

In Bowen v. Wyoming Dep't of Transportation, -- P.3d ----, 2011 WL 9617 (Wyo.), 2011 WY 1, the defendant appealed from an administrative decision, finding that the driver was collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of the admissibility of his breath test results in his administrative license suspension hearing after the circuit court had already decided that issue against him in a criminal proceeding. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming was asked to decide whether collateral estoppel coud be applied from a criminal case to a civil license administration case. Most states have previoulsy ruled that collateral estoppel should not apply from an administrative hearing (implied consent) to a criminal case, under various theories. One theory involves the fact that the implied consent hearing is summary in nature, so that a 'full and fair' adjudication may not occur. Another theory preventing collateral estoppel from a drivers license suspension hearing and a criminal DUI case could be that the parties are not identical (one involves the DMV where the other involves District Attorneys and the 'People').

The Wyoming Supreme Court analyzed the issue as follows:
The issue raised in this appeal is one of first impression for this Court. Furthermore, we are unable to find authority from any other jurisdiction addressing this particular factual scenario.FN3 Nevertheless, we find application of collateral estoppel to these facts to be clear and straightforward: 1) the issue was identical in both proceedings: whether the trooper was properly trained to perform the breath test using the EC/IR II making the breath-test results admissible; 2) the circuit court's determination that the trooper was properly trained and that the breath test was admissible was a final determination of that issue; 3) the appellant, the party against whom collateral estoppel was asserted, was a party to both proceedings; 4) finally, the prior criminal case afforded the appellant a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. When applying collateral estoppel to an issue raised in a civil action, which issue was previously litigated in a criminal action, we have said that criminal proceedings present a defendant with a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues because a criminal defendant has strong incentives to defend vigorously the charges against him. Worman v. Carver, 2002 WY 59, 21, 44 P.3d 82, 87-88 (Wyo.2002). In this case, the criminal proceedings afforded the appellant a full evidentiary hearing wherein he offered evidence, examined witnesses, and made arguments. FN4

FN3. We note that courts have addressed the applicability of collateral estoppel under other circumstances involving criminal and administrative cases. See Huelsman v. Kansas Dep't of Revenue, 980 P.2d 1022, 1025-27 (Kan.1999) (suppression of evidence in DUI prosecution based on lack of probable cause did not collaterally estop state from arguing in license suspension proceeding that officer had “reasonable grounds” to request a breath test pursuant to the implied consent law); State v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269, 273-77 (Neb.Ct.App.1995) (holding that collateral estoppel does not require a criminal court to accept as binding an administrative proceeding's license revocation determination); In re Mehrer, 273 N.W.2d 194, 197 (S.D.1979) (no collateral estoppel in license revocation proceedings despite dismissal of DUI charge against defendant in criminal case because different elements must be proven to show DUI versus violation of implied consent laws); City of Manhattan v. Huncovsky, 913 P.2d 227, 232 (Kan.Ct.App.1996) (criminal court not collaterally estopped from deciding validity of breath test where agency questioned validity of breath test results and dismissed administrative proceedings).


We conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the appellant from relitigating the question of whether his breath test results were legally obtained.FN5 The OAHs determination is affirmed.

The Wyoming Supreme Court refused, however, to issue a bright-line ruling. Instead, they ruled that each case would have to be decided on a fact-specific basis. Thus, it is likely that a party can always get a "second bite at the apple" if they have additional evidence to present:
FN5. We note the limited nature of our decision in this matter. Although we find that collateral estoppel applies under these specific circumstances, the same may not be true in other similar situations. For example, we cannot say that collateral estoppel would always bar an administrative body from addressing an issue previously decided by a criminal court; nor does this holding stand for the proposition that a criminal defendant should be collaterally estopped from arguing an issue in his criminal case that had previously been decided in an administrative proceeding. Neither of these questions, nor any others not specifically addressed, were raised by the parties nor do they arise under the facts of this case.
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DUI Appeal of the Day - Improper Lane Usage

In Illinois v. Hackett, --- N.E.2d ----, 2010 WL 5420188 (Ill.App. 3 Dist.), the trial court granted the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The testimony revealed that the defendant crossed over the lane divider between the northbound lanes at least twice. He argued that he may have been avoiding potholes, although the officer (Blouin) testified that he didn't see any potholes. Upholding the trial court's ruling, the majority stated:
There are too many innocent circumstances that might cause a motorist to momentarily and inadvertently inch across a lane divider to find that such action, without more creates probable cause to arrest.
In this case, by Blouin's own admission, defendant's tires only slightly crossed the lane divider for mere seconds before defendant continued to operate his vehicle entirely in the left-hand lane of traffic. Instructive and in stark contrast is Smith, where the defendant drove with his wheels straddling the lane dividers by six inches on opposite sides of the street on two separate occasions, effectively driving in three lanes of traffic for approximately 150 yards each time. With regard to the second requirement of the statute, nothing in Blouin's testimony provides any bases to find that if defendant did change from the left lane of traffic to the right, however briefly, he did not do so without first determining that it was safe. The evidence does not provide grounds upon which to find that defendant's driving endangered himself, pedestrians, or other vehicles at any time.
The fun part of this opinion involves the unusually course banter between the majority and the dissent.

The majority wrote the following:
FN1. The dissent, typically and predictably, resorts to ridicule, hyperbole, personal anecdotes and observations, assaults on positions not taken by the majority, quotes taken out of context, and facts outside the record to attack a legal analysis with which he does not agree. If the majority decision is indeed wrong, it should be possible to demonstrate that error in a mature and professional counteranalysis.
The dissent countered with:

This opinion would not standup to a Vinny Gambini cross-examination. I can only think of that renowned trial lawyer's cross-examination of witness Mr. Tipton regarding the time it took to cook grits on Tipton's stove. Vinny Gambini would undoubtedly ask whether the law of physics cease to exist on highways in the Third District allowing a vehicle to travel for four seconds with its tires in two separate lanes and yet not be “actually driving in more than one lane of traffic.” Was this a magic pickup truck? Did the defendant buy his truck from the same guy that sold Jack his beanstalk beans? If the defendant was not actually driving in more than one lane of traffic, what was he “actually” doing? Just what is a reasonably appreciable distance? How does an officer decide? The majority leaves no workable rule.

I could write a four-volume dissent on this case, picking apart one silly sentence after another in the majority opinion. However, I will stop here. The thrust of the majority opinion is that the majority believes that police should not be able to stop people for minor traffic violations. I suppose we all feel that way when we are stopped for one. This is the appellate court; we do not get to rewrite the law based upon our feelings about it. The supreme court and the legislature have that power. We do not. Clearly, the officer had probable cause to stop the defendant for improper lane usage. The supreme court's decision in Smith is not ambiguous. Whether the defendant inadvertently or intentionally swerved twice across the lane divider lane is irrelevant. The majority opinion stands the law on its head and creates a totally unworkable scheme for traffic law enforcement. Do we apply the same analysis to speeding? Must one speed for a “reasonably appreciable distance” to violate speed laws?

*10 Illinois has five appellate courts and one supreme court. Our supreme court does not have the resources to correct every wrongly decided appellate decision. The majority undoubtedly is banking on the fact that the court will have more pressing matters before it and not grant a petition for leave to appeal on this matter. With all due respect, the majority opinion is nonsense, plain and simple. Even worse, it endangers the lives of the motoring public by limiting the ability of police officers to stop erratic drivers. I dissent.
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Is "erratic driving" alone cause for a DWI investigation?

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A few weeks ago we asked a similar question. In that case, an Illinois driver, the son of the local mayor, ran into stationary cars in a parking lot and then drove off from the scene of the accident. When police tracked him down later that evening, a breathalyzer test was not issued since there were no outward signs of intoxication. In a remarkably similar case, a DuPage County Judge, Kenneth L. Popejoy, was likewise not required to submit to a breathlyzer test. As reported in a Daily Herald article, on the evening of June 29th, a number of witnesses allegedly called 911 after seeing Judge Popejoy run into a parked vehicle, run a stop sign and nearly hit a jogger. When police arrived at his home, he refused to answer any questions. According to Glen Ellyn Deputy Police Chief Bill Holmer, because he showed no signs of intoxication, he was not investigated for DUI:

"We can't compel him to take (a breathalyzer test)," Holmer said, adding: "There weren't any of the typical signs of impairment that we look for, such as smell or slurred speech. None of that was apparent."

In the article, Don Ramsell, of our office, agreed with Holmer's assessment of the situation:

Wheaton DUI and criminal defense attorney Donald Ramsell said that while police have a responsibility to investigate why a driver fled without reporting an accident, there's no cause to give a Breathalyzer or field-sobriety test without an odor, impaired speech or some other indication of alcohol.

"It would be improper to administer a breath test if you have no outward sign of alcohol consumption," Ramsell said. "It's illegal to fish for a crime."

Although Judge Popejoy was not charged with any DUI-related offenses, he was charged with charged with reckless driving, failure to give information after striking an unattended motor vehicle and failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. The investigating police departments contend that preferential treatment was not a factor in the decision not to pursue a DUI investigation, and it is noted in the article that both towns "have handled recent high-profile DUI arrests of public officials, such as those of a Glendale Heights cop and U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia's daughter." Visit Americas Top DUI and DWI Attorneys at www.1800dialdui.com or call 1-800-DIAL-DUI to find a DUI OUI DWI Attorney Lawyer Now!

Is a car accident alone evidence of intoxication?

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Does the mere fact that an automobile accident occurred warrant testing to determine if the driver was intoxicated? What if the driver of the vehicle left the scene before police arrived? What if witnesses to the crash claimed that the driver was acting erratic? What if the driver was the mayor's son? These are just a few of the questions that arose from a recent automobile accident that occurred in Elk Grove Village, Illinois. As described in this Daily Herald article, the accident occurred in the parking lot of an apartment complex. Witnesses claim that a pickup truck ran into stationary cars parked in the lot. The driver exited his vehicle and was shaking and talking to himself. He then got back into his vehicle, despite the urging of witnesses to remain at the scene, and drove off. His license plate remained behind, however, and responding police officers were able to determine that the vehicle belonged to Craig Johnson Jr., the son of the mayor. Officers then located him that same evening, brought him into the station, questioned him, and issued him a series of tickets for traffic violations, none of which were DUI-related. He was never given a breath test or asked to perform field sobriety tests. Some claimed that he received special treatment because he was the mayor's son. However, Don Ramsell, of our office, explained that Johnson did not necessarily receive preferential treatment:

Wheaton DUI and criminal defense attorney Donald Ramsell said that while police have a responsibility to investigate why a driver hit three parked vehicles, there's no cause to give a Breathalyzer or field sobriety test without an odor, impaired speech or some other indication of alcohol.

"It would be improper to administer a breath test if you have no outward sign of alcohol consumption," Ramsell said. "It's illegal to fish for a crime."

Still, "it's not like the parked car jumped in front of him," so Johnson should have been asked to provide a satisfactory explanation for the crash, such as bad weather or a sudden obstacle in the road, Ramsell said.

In Illinois, the odor of alcohol combined with an accident is enough probable cause for a breath test, Ramsell said.

So, an accident alone isn't sufficient evidence to support the inference of intoxication. And in this case, there were no allegations that the driver smelled of alcohol, so perhaps the police were justified in not administering a breath test or sobriety tests. A further review of police records would assist in making this determination, but as it stands, based on the facts known at this time, the actions of the police weren't necessarily suspect.

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Sloppy lab work leads to Toxicology Chief resigning in Indiana

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Two weeks ago we discussed how lab errors in California, Colorado and Pennsylvania resulted in challenges to DUI convictions and the dismissal of a multitude of DUI cases. It looks like Indiana is joining the club. According to this article from IndyStar.com, the director of the Indiana State Department of Toxicology, Michael A. Wagner, has resigned amidst charges of inexcusable lab errors. Allegations include sloppy lab work, excessively long delays in processing specimens, and the failure to perform inspections as required by state law. In the article, Indianapolis defense attorney John L. Tompkins explained the basis for the allegations:

Tompkins, who teaches blood-testing issues to lawyers for their continuing education requirements, said sloppy work is not unusual from the state Department of Toxicology.

Within the past few months, he said, blood-testing reports have come back showing clotted blood being used -- a mistake -- and incomplete documentation of the testing machine's calibration.

Tompkins also contends that the department ignores a state law enacted in 2007...(which) requires the Department of Toxicology to conduct examinations of the people performing blood-alcohol detection tests and inspections of the equipment they use.

If the allegations are true, the resignation of Wagner is only the first step toward achieving justice for those who have been wrongfully convicted of DUI in Indiana. Simply put, the accusations of sloppy lab work are inexcusable. Where the life and liberty of a person accused of a crime is at stake, it is imperative that lab test results be performed carefully, accurately and in a timely manner. Visit Americas Top DUI and DWI Attorneys at www.1800dialdui.com or call 1-800-DIAL-DUI to find a DUI OUI DWI Attorney Lawyer Now!

Inexcusable lab errors in DUI cases

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Tests for blood alcohol content are not infallible and can be tainted by any number of factors, including human error and faulty equipment. It is for that reason that good DUI defense attorneys never assume that tests results are accurate. Case in point--in recent months, across the country, lab errors have resulted in the dismissal of DUI charges. For example, as reported at denverpost.com, 7 DUI cases were dismissed due to lab errors:

Colorado Springs authorities in December announced the discovery of errors and a review of results at the lab where the alcohol content in blood samples was higher than the true result...In all, the lab retested 7,892 blood alcohol cases dating back to 2006 and found a total of 206 errors. Of the nine affected cases, five defendants had served jail time.

In San Francisco, human error and tampering is alleged to have affected thousands of criminal cases. The lab test problems, which were initially thought to have affected only drug cases, may affect DUI cases as well, as explained in this ABC article:

The public defender's office says the shortcomings which the scandal exposed in the drug unit, may also pertain to DUI testing. They include sloppy work, lack of protocols and inadequate staffing..."One of the most critical pieces of evidence in a driving under the influence case is whether or not the person had alcohol in his system and how much," former San Francisco crime lab director Jim Norris said.

Elsewhere, in Pennsylvania, one county is taking matters into its own hands in order to save money. In Cumberland County, officials have decided to hire a phlebotomist rather than outsource blood alcohol testing. As noted at the Philadelphia DUI Blog, this new arrangement concerns local DUI attorneys:

"I worry about the chain of custody," said a Harrisburg Pa DUI lawyer, referring to the problems in administering the county's part-time blood lab. Indeed, many Pennsylvania lawyers feel that such blood tests, if done at the hands of the county, could pose problems relating to conflicts of interest and impartiality.

Blood alcohol testing is a critical area of concern and plays a key role in the evidentiary burden of the prosecutors. But if the evidence were left in the hands of the county prosecutors, isn't it natural that Pa DUI lawyers would have objection?

Prosecutors and law enforcement officers rely on lab test results to convict people of crimes, such as DUI, which can wrongfully deprive innocent citizens of their liberty if performed incorrectly. For that reason, accurate lab test results are of paramount concern.

The lab testing scandals in Colorado and California and the potential conflicts of interest raised by the newly proposed lab testing scheme in Pennsylvania are clear indications that we still have a long way to go. Innocent people continue to be wrongfully convicted of DUI every day, something that is inexcusable--and entirely preventable.

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VIDEO: Ten Rules for Dealing with Police

No one likes being stopped by the police, even if it's for a simple traffic infraction. Regardless of why you've been detained, any police encounter is bound to be nerve wracking. Sure, in an ideal world, you'd have your criminal defense lawyer right there with you--but in the real world you can still make educated decisions about the police encounter as long as you know your rights and how to assert them in a calm and effective manner. The following is a great video from the Cato Institute that can help you do this. It's called "Ten Rules for Dealing with Police." In it, attorney Bill Murphy explains, in everyday language, how to effectively deal with the police while asserting your Constitutional rights. Visit Americas Top DUI and DWI Attorneys at www.1800dialdui.com or call 1-800-DIAL-DUI to find a DUI OUI DWI Attorney Lawyer Now!

Chicago Tribune Castigates Lawyers and Judges for Allowing "Dangerous Drivers" to Drive

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A few weeks ago the Chicago Tribune suggested in this article, "Judges don't slow 100 mph speeders" that Illinois judges, and to an extent, defense attorneys, were responsible for excessive leniency toward chronic and dangerous drivers. It is suggested in the article that in some counties, judges tend to give breaks to "dangerous drivers" who appear with attorneys:

Prosecutors in DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will counties insist they rarely accept plea deals calling for supervision for people driving 100 mph or faster. Most blame judges for agreeing to it.

In DuPage County, where 62 percent of triple-digit speeders get the deal, State's Attorney Joe Birkett said those speeders usually impress judges by getting attorneys.

"Unfortunately, the mere fact they step up with a lawyer, the judge will take into consideration that this person is taking this seriously," Birkett said.

Judges in those counties, for their part, say they look at every case individually. They don't want to be overly harsh. Convictions can cost a driver his or her license, which could mean losing a job. And, judges often face a heavy volume of cases, with pressure to move through them quickly and assign fines.

Unfortunately, the the article is based upon incorrect facts and assumptions that call into question the conclusions reached therein. For example:

• Contrary to the claim in the article, sentences of court supervision do not keep the tickets ‘off’ the drivers’ records--in fact, the Tribune was easily able to locate the records of drivers who received this sentence
• The article refers to people convicted of speeding as "dangerous drivers," but in the article, the Tribune was unable to locate any evidence that drivers who received a sentence of court supervision had been in an accident after receiving that sentence

Another important omission--the article fails to mention that in 2000, Jesse White and the named prosecutors successfully lobbied to make speeding 40 mph above the limit a crime – a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to 1 year in jail. Thus, anyone convicted of this ticket is now a convicted criminal in the eyes of the law, and that conviction follows a person for their lifetime. Such a conviction is a strong barrier toward future employment. At that time, the Illinois State Bar Association opposed making speeding a crime, predicting that it would cause judges to offer court supervision more frequently, due to the harsh consequences of a criminal conviction. And, lo and behold, that's exactly what appears to be happening. Finally, Jesse White’s suggestion that we should be treating speeders as convicted criminals is wrong. The suggestion that a speeding driver with no accidents on his record should be treated more harshly than a person caught stealing, or criminally damaging property, or assaulting or battering another (all also Class A misdemeanors) is simply wrong. We do not punish people for what might or could happen. Speeding should be discouraged--not demonized. **Visit Americas Top DUI and DWI Attorneys at www.1800dialdui.com or call 1-800-DIAL-DUI to find a DUI OUI DWI Attorney Lawyer Now**