"The record does not establish that the foreperson withheld any information. She truthfully stated both on her questionnaire and during voir dire that she knew a particular prosecutor. The juror questionnaire is not in the record, but there is nothing to indicate that the questionnaire asked specific questions about the nature of a prospective juror's relationship with anyone, and even if it did, counsel still had an obligation to follow-up with oral questions. Hammett's trial counsel chose not to ask about the nature of the foreperson's relationship with the prosecutor. We also note that the venire was sworn in by the judge before voir dire, and we take judicial notice that the oath requires prospective jurors to answer truthfully any questions propounded to them. It does not impose a duty on the prospective jurors to volunteer information."
America's Top DUI DWI Lawyers™ and Attorneys at 1-800-DIAL-DUI or www.1800dialdui.com have successfully defended thousands of DUI DWI and Drunk Driving Arrests in Ohio, Illinois, Texas, Michigan, Virginia, Massachusetts, Colorado, California, Nevada, Oregon, Minnesota, Iowa, Florida, New Hampshire, Virginia, Arizona and Maryland.
Showing posts with label jurors. Show all posts
Showing posts with label jurors. Show all posts
Tuesday, November 22, 2011
DUI Law - Juror Dating Fellow Prosecutor No Big Whoop Says Texas
In Hammett v. State of Texas, Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2011 WL 5189109 (Tex.App.-El Paso), the defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to 180 days in jail, probated for 18 months. On appeal, Hammett asserted that he was denied a fair trial because the foreperson on the jury failed to disclose that she was dating a prosecutor. On appeal, the court affirmed the conviction:
"The record does not establish that the foreperson withheld any information. She truthfully stated both on her questionnaire and during voir dire that she knew a particular prosecutor. The juror questionnaire is not in the record, but there is nothing to indicate that the questionnaire asked specific questions about the nature of a prospective juror's relationship with anyone, and even if it did, counsel still had an obligation to follow-up with oral questions. Hammett's trial counsel chose not to ask about the nature of the foreperson's relationship with the prosecutor. We also note that the venire was sworn in by the judge before voir dire, and we take judicial notice that the oath requires prospective jurors to answer truthfully any questions propounded to them. It does not impose a duty on the prospective jurors to volunteer information."
"The record does not establish that the foreperson withheld any information. She truthfully stated both on her questionnaire and during voir dire that she knew a particular prosecutor. The juror questionnaire is not in the record, but there is nothing to indicate that the questionnaire asked specific questions about the nature of a prospective juror's relationship with anyone, and even if it did, counsel still had an obligation to follow-up with oral questions. Hammett's trial counsel chose not to ask about the nature of the foreperson's relationship with the prosecutor. We also note that the venire was sworn in by the judge before voir dire, and we take judicial notice that the oath requires prospective jurors to answer truthfully any questions propounded to them. It does not impose a duty on the prospective jurors to volunteer information."
Thursday, November 03, 2011
DUI Laws - Colorado Trial Jury Improperly Uses Dictionary
On appeal, as a matter of first impression, the appellate court found that the juror's statement during deliberations that the penalty for the offense was a “slap on the wrist,” did not constitute extraneous information. The trial court found that a juror claimed to have had some pre-existing personal experience with vehicular eluding and that he told the other jurors that the penalty for the offense was a “slap on the wrist.” The appeals court wrote as follows:
"Neither party cited, and we have not found, any reported Colorado opinion deciding whether a juror's statement regarding the severity of a charged offense constitutes extraneous information under CRE 606(b). However, jurors may apply their general knowledge and everyday life experience in deliberations. Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1064. Therefore, testimony that jurors held discussions based on a juror's general knowledge or personal experiences cannot be offered to impeach a verdict under CRE 606(b). See id. We conclude that this general rule also applies to the general knowledge of, and previous personal experiences with, the criminal justice system of a lay juror, as opposed to an attorney or other person with professional or educational expertise in that field."
* * *
"Here, the juror's statement was based upon his own personal knowledge, obtained before the trial began. Therefore, we conclude that the juror's statement was not extraneous information, but instead was part of the jury's internal discussions and cannot be offered as evidence to impeach the verdict..."
In reversing the finding that the use of the dictionary required a new trial, the appeals court stated:
"Here, the trial court found that a member of the jury brought a dictionary definition of “elude” or “eluding” into the jury room and shared it with several jurors. A juror's looking up of a dictionary definition of a crime of which the defendant has been charged is improper and affidavits concerning that fact are admissible under CRE 606(b). Wiser v. People, 732 P.3d 1139, 1141 (Colo.1987). The affidavits do not, however, disclose what definition the jurors considered, or whether the definition was inconsistent with the language of the vehicular eluding statute.FN2 Defendant bears the burden of proving that the extraneous information posed a reasonable possibility of prejudice to him. See Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1064. By failing to provide the content of the definition, defendant failed to meet his burden of proving prejudice. The trial court, therefore, erred by concluding that the definition presented to the jury was prejudicial and ordering a new trial based on that conclusion."
Thursday, October 20, 2011
OUI Law - MA Law on Juror Replacement During Deliberations
In today's case the issue involved the replacement of a juror during deliberations. In Commonwealth v. Cameron, Slip Copy, 2011 WL 3341091 (Table) (Mass.App.Ct.) during jury deliberations, the trial judge dismissed a juror because of a communication problem raised by other jurors. The defendant appealed upon two grounds: (1) that the judge discharged the juror without good cause in violation of the defendant's due process rights; and (2) that the judge's failure to instruct the remaining jurors on the reason for the discharge prejudiced the defendant.
The appeals court found no error:
"The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he removed Mr. B because he had language problems. Mr. B admitted that he was having difficulty understanding the deliberations. When the judge asked Mr. B whether he did not feel fluent enough, Mr. B's response—“To make a decide this case”—permitted the trial judge to find that Mr. B had problems with the English language. See Commonwealth v. Leftwich, 430 Mass. 865, 873 (2000) (noting that inability to perform functions of juror must be supported by record). An inability to speak and understand the English language disqualifies a person from jury service; thus it is good cause for discharge. See G.L. c. 234A, § 4; Commonwealth v. Acen, 396 Mass. 472, 479 (1986) (“It is unquestionable that an ability to speak English is a relevant and important qualification for jurors”). Additionally, the language problem was obviously personal to Mr. B and unrelated to the issues of the case."
As to instructing the other jurors as to the reason for discharge, the law on that issue in MA states:
“If a juror is discharged and an alternate substituted, the jury should be instructed not only to begin deliberations anew ... but also that the reason for discharge is entirely personal and has nothing to do with the discharged juror's views on the case or his relationship with his fellow jurors.” Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. at 845–846. However, “[a] judge is not required in every case to adhere to the precise language ... used in Commonwealth v. Connor.” Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, supra at 151. Some circumstances that surround the discharge of a deliberating juror “will leave no room for speculation as to the reason for the discharge, such that the failure to give a Connor instruction is not error.” Ibid .
The appeals court found no actual error. "This case presents the circumstances which do not require the Connor instruction. The reason for the discharge was obvious to all the jurors. The judge was informed that “several” jurors were having difficulty communicating with Mr. B. In each individual colloquy, the judge confirmed the issue by referencing a difficulty in communicating with Mr. B."
The appeals court found no error:
"The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he removed Mr. B because he had language problems. Mr. B admitted that he was having difficulty understanding the deliberations. When the judge asked Mr. B whether he did not feel fluent enough, Mr. B's response—“To make a decide this case”—permitted the trial judge to find that Mr. B had problems with the English language. See Commonwealth v. Leftwich, 430 Mass. 865, 873 (2000) (noting that inability to perform functions of juror must be supported by record). An inability to speak and understand the English language disqualifies a person from jury service; thus it is good cause for discharge. See G.L. c. 234A, § 4; Commonwealth v. Acen, 396 Mass. 472, 479 (1986) (“It is unquestionable that an ability to speak English is a relevant and important qualification for jurors”). Additionally, the language problem was obviously personal to Mr. B and unrelated to the issues of the case."
As to instructing the other jurors as to the reason for discharge, the law on that issue in MA states:
“If a juror is discharged and an alternate substituted, the jury should be instructed not only to begin deliberations anew ... but also that the reason for discharge is entirely personal and has nothing to do with the discharged juror's views on the case or his relationship with his fellow jurors.” Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. at 845–846. However, “[a] judge is not required in every case to adhere to the precise language ... used in Commonwealth v. Connor.” Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, supra at 151. Some circumstances that surround the discharge of a deliberating juror “will leave no room for speculation as to the reason for the discharge, such that the failure to give a Connor instruction is not error.” Ibid .
The appeals court found no actual error. "This case presents the circumstances which do not require the Connor instruction. The reason for the discharge was obvious to all the jurors. The judge was informed that “several” jurors were having difficulty communicating with Mr. B. In each individual colloquy, the judge confirmed the issue by referencing a difficulty in communicating with Mr. B."
Sunday, June 05, 2011
DWI Appeal - When the Juror and Witness Know Each Other
In Morris v. State of Texas, --- S.W.3d ----, 2011 WL 2163719 (Tex.App.-Dallas), the defendant appealed the conviction for DWI on the basis that the trial court should have declared a mistrial when it came out during trial that one of the jurors knew one of the witnesses.
During voir dire, no one was asked whether they knew any of the witnesses. After trial began, a witness to the defendants driving revealed that she knew one of the jurors. The witness was called outside the jury's presence and testified that she and one of the jurors had played soccer together for about two years, but had not been in contact for over a year. Morris moved for a mistrial arguing that the juror would likely find the witness credible because of their prior relationship. The trial judge then questioned the juror, who confirmed she had played soccer with the witness for one season about two years before, but they did not have a relationship outside of soccer and they had not spoken since then. The juror said that her prior relationship with the witness would not affect her in deciding the case. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial.
The decision not to declare a mistrial was affirmed:
Looking for a Top DUI DWI Attorney? Visit Americas Top DUI and DWI Attorneys at http://www.1800dialdui.com or call 1-800-DIAL-DUI to find a DUI OUI DWI Attorney Lawyer Now!
During voir dire, no one was asked whether they knew any of the witnesses. After trial began, a witness to the defendants driving revealed that she knew one of the jurors. The witness was called outside the jury's presence and testified that she and one of the jurors had played soccer together for about two years, but had not been in contact for over a year. Morris moved for a mistrial arguing that the juror would likely find the witness credible because of their prior relationship. The trial judge then questioned the juror, who confirmed she had played soccer with the witness for one season about two years before, but they did not have a relationship outside of soccer and they had not spoken since then. The juror said that her prior relationship with the witness would not affect her in deciding the case. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial.
The decision not to declare a mistrial was affirmed:
"The “mere fact that a juror knows, or is a neighbor, or an intimate acquaintance of, and on friendly relations with, one of the parties to a suit, is not sufficient basis for disqualification.” Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (quoting Allbright v. Smith, 5 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Comm'n App.1928, judgm't adopted)). Mere acquaintance with the defendant or a State's witness is not a sufficient basis for disqualification of a juror. See Taylor v. State, 671 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, pet. ref'd). The juror's statement that the prior relationship would not affect her decision in the case supports the trial court's ruling. We overrule Morris's first point of error.
Looking for a Top DUI DWI Attorney? Visit Americas Top DUI and DWI Attorneys at http://www.1800dialdui.com or call 1-800-DIAL-DUI to find a DUI OUI DWI Attorney Lawyer Now!
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)